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Software startups in the United States continue to create new technologies
that provide a high degree of interactivity among consumer devices such as
mobile phones. To protect their innovations, many companies acquire patents
that contain method claims covering interactive technology. These claims may
require more than a single party to perform all the required steps. To
successfully enforce a patent when more than one party performs all of the steps
of a claimed method, the Federal Circuit recently held that the patentee must
show that one of the alleged infringers induced the infringement of the other
party. As a result, where inducement is not present, parties can use and
benefit from new interactive technologies without liability for patent
infringement. Several commentators have suggested that patentees can avoid
this fate by drafting better claims. Unfortunately, given today’s advances in
technology, even expert claim drafting cannot protect patentees from an
unauthorized use of their innovative method. Accordingly, this loophole in the
law should be closed.
This Article analyzes the development of joint infringement theory,
including the Federal Circuit’s recent rehearing of its own decisions, in
conjunction with advancements in technology. This Article argues that the
law should not focus solely on inducement. Instead, this Article suggests an
alternative approach that relies on practical considerations that the law
traditionally considered in contributory infringement analysis. The goal of
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this approach is to increase the likelihood that the law will protect deserving
interactive methods from infringement while balancing concerns that a broader
policy will ensnare innocent actors.
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INTRODUCTION
Imagine that you have developed a new social media service. You
1
are the first to offer this type of experience on the Internet. Early
adopters proclaim that your service is the next Facebook, and the
2
business becomes successful. You file a patent application on your
invention that includes claims directed to the method of providing
your social media service. Years later, the United States Patent and
Trademark Office (USPTO) grants your patent, giving you the right
to exclude others from making, using, or selling the method of
3
providing your service.
Independently, Facebook decides to provide a similar media
service. Facebook hosts the software that provides the service on its
servers and disseminates to its business partners instructions on how
to use the software. This arrangement allows Facebook and its
partners to perform some of the steps of your claimed method
4
separately without any one actor performing every step.
Armed with a patent, you sue Facebook for patent infringement.
After a grueling jury trial, the jury awards you millions of dollars in
5
damages for lost profits. In addition, the judge grants a permanent
6
injunction prohibiting Facebook from using your online service.
7
Unfortunately, on appeal you lose. Since you cannot provide any
1. For one example of such a service, see Daniel Casciato, Grant Street Co. Gets
$84.6 Million Award, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER (ONLINE) (Aug. 1, 2007), available at
http://www.danielcasciato.com/portfolio/documents/GrantStreetCo.pdf
(stating
that Muniauction conducted the first online auction in 1997, having patented
Internet bidding for municipal bonds).
2. Meaning the inventor has come up with an Internet-based service that seems
destined to generate consumer excitement. See, e.g., Christina Amoroso, Pinterest Is
the New Facebook, N.Y. POST (Mar. 19, 2012, 11:53 AM), http://www.nypost.com/p/
entertainment/pinterest_is_the_new_facebook_LfoXeclYOLBVwunF1bhteM
(describing the rise in popularity of the social media service Pinterest as “one of the
world’s most-visited Websites”).
3. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2006) (“[W]hoever without authority makes, uses,
offers to sell, or sells any patented invention . . . infringes the patent.”).
4. From the consumer/user perspective the hypothetical service created by
Facebook would perform similarly, if not identically, to the claimed service.
5. Muniauction, introduced at the beginning of this thought experiment,
received just such a verdict. See Casciato, supra note 1 (discussing Grant Street
Group’s $84.6 million damage award after a federal jury found that Thomson Corp.
and iDeal willfully infringed a patent for auctioning municipal bonds over the
Internet).
6. See id. (reporting that Judge Gary Lancaster granted a permanent injunction
prohibiting the future use and sale of the defendants’ electronic bid submission
system).
7. See Thomson Wins Appeal of $77M Verdict in Suit on Bond Auction Patent,
ANDREWS COMPUTER & INTERNET LITIG. REP., July 23, 2008, at 9 (characterizing the
patent at issue as “a prime example of the types . . . that have bedeviled the courts”
while reporting the Federal Circuit’s decision in favor of the defendant in
Muniauction, Inc. v. Thomson Corp., 532 F.3d 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2008), overruled by
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evidence that Facebook induced its partners to perform some of the
claimed method steps, the court holds that Facebook and its partners
8
Accordingly, because
are not liable for patent infringement.
performance of your method is split among various actors, Facebook
benefits from your innovation for free, essentially rendering your
9
patent worthless.
The above scenario is fictional. Unfortunately for some patentees,
similar events have been occurring in the United Sates for at least the
10
last five years. It could happen to any startup, not just the next
Internet mogul. For example, researchers at the University of
Washington have developed a contact lens with integrated
optoelectronic components such as control circuits, communication
11
circuits, and antennas.
The scientists believe the technology,
although still in the early stages of development, will have hundreds
of useful medical applications, including the ability to measure levels
of cholesterol, potassium, and sodium in the body, as well as report
12
those results, via a wireless transmitter, to a doctor or nurse. This

Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 692 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (en
banc) (per curiam).
8. See Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc. (Akamai II), 692 F.3d
1301, 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (en banc) (per curiam) (holding that there can be
liability for induced infringement where all the steps are not performed by a single
entity).
9. As Judge Newman remarked in her dissent from McKesson Technologies Inc. v.
Epic Systems Corp., “[a] patent that cannot be enforced on any theory of
infringement, is not a statutory patent right. It is a cynical, and expensive, delusion
to encourage innovators to develop new interactive procedures, only to find that the
courts will not recognize the patent because the participants are independent
entities.”
98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1281, 1291 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (Newman, J.,
dissenting), rev’d sub nom. Akamai II, 692 F.3d 1301.
10. See, e.g., id. at 1285 (majority opinion) (reminding the plaintiff that the
“court has time and again rejected liability” absent agency or contract); Akamai
Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc. (Akamai I), 629 F.3d 1311, 1318–19 (Fed.
Cir. 2010) (characterizing the requirement that a single party to perform every step
in order to find infringement as “well settled,” and continuing to require direction
or control over third parties), rev’d en banc, per curiam, 692 F.3d 1301; Golden Hour
Data Sys., Inc. v. emsCharts, Inc., 614 F.3d 1367, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (agreeing with
the lower court’s finding of no joint infringement); Muniauction, 532 F.3d at 1330
(relying on BMC Res., Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P., 498 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2007), to
reverse judgment in favor of the defendant without a showing of control or
direction), overruled by Akamai II, 692 F.3d 1301; BMC Res., Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P.,
498 F.3d 1373, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (requiring evidence that the defendant was
“vicariously responsible for the actions of the unrelated parties”), overruled by Akamai
II, 692 F.3d 1301.
11. See Babak A. Parviz, Augmented Reality in a Contact Lens, IEEE SPECTRUM, (Sept.
2009), http://spectrum.ieee.org/biomedical/bionics/augmented-reality-in-a-contact
-lens/0 (overviewing technological add-ons to conventional polymer lenses).
12. See id. (contextualizing the research, which “barely hints at” near-future
possibilities).
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medical technology is most likely patentable.
However, multiple
parties could divide the performance of the steps of any claimed
method for using the contact lens system to benefit from its
14
innovations and avoid patent infringement.
This type of legal gamesmanship can occur under what is known as
the “single entity” doctrine, where a single party must perform or use
every step of the claimed method to be liable for direct
15
infringement. While the theory of joint infringement provides for
an alternative method of enforcement, the circumstances necessary
to find joint liability for patent infringement when multiple parties
perform every step of a method claim but no single party performs all
16
of them have continued to change over the last five years.
In the last five years, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
17
Circuit has issued several opinions in joint infringement cases. In
18
BMC Resources, Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P., the court affirmed that,
where multiple parties perform steps of a method claim, the entire
method must be performed at the control or direction of the alleged
19
direct infringer. Approximately one year later, in Muniauction, Inc.
20
v. Thomson Corp., the Federal Circuit reversed the lower court,
finding that “the control or direction standard is satisfied in
situations where the law would traditionally hold the accused direct
infringer vicariously liable for the acts committed by another party
21
that are required to complete performance of a claimed method.”
13. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (stating that patentable subject matter includes the
discovery or invention of “any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or
composition of matter”).
14. See BMC, 498 F.3d at 1381 (“This court acknowledges that the standard
requiring control or direction for a finding of joint infringement may in some
circumstances allow parties to enter into arms-length agreements to avoid
infringement.”).
15. See id. at 1378–79 (raising and rejecting the possibility that such a
requirement “provide[s] a loophole for a party to escape infringement”).
16. See Akamai II, 692 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (en banc) (per curiam)
(reversing prior Federal Circuit decisions in BMC and Muniauction).
17. See, e.g., McKesson Techs. Inc. v. Epic Sys. Corp., 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1281,
1282–83 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (reviewing de novo and affirming judgment granted for
the defendant as a matter of law on the question of joint infringement), rev’d sub
nom. Akamai II, 692 F.3d 1301; Akamai I, 629 F.3d 1311, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (same),
rev’d, Akamai II, 692 F.3d 1301; Golden Hour Data Sys., Inc. v. emsCharts, Inc., 614
F.3d 1367, 1380–81 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (same); Muniauction, Inc. v. Thomson Corp.,
532 F.3d 1318, 1329–30 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (brushing aside the parties’ relationships as
irrelevant), overruled by Akamai II, 692 F.3d 1301; BMC, 498 F.3d at 1378 (considering
the proper standard for joint infringement).
18. 498 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2007), overruled by Akamai II, 692 F.3d 1301.
19. See id. at 1380–81 (conceding that the requirement sometimes allows armslength parties to avoid infringement, but nevertheless concluding that such concerns
do not outweigh those of expanding direct infringement).
20. 532 F.3d 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2008), overruled by Akamai II, 692 F.3d 1301.
21. Id. at 1330.
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The Federal Circuit’s most recent decisions are the most
controversial. In Akamai Technologies, Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc.
22
(Akamai I), the Federal Circuit elaborated on the holdings in BMC
and Muniauction, stating that the patentee must either prove that a
mastermind is vicariously liable for the actions of the other party
under traditional agency principles or that the other party is
contractually obligated to the mastermind to perform the claimed
23
24
step. In McKesson Technologies Inc. v. Epic Systems Corp., the Federal
25
Circuit closely followed the holding in Akamai I.
In her dissent in McKesson, Judge Newman highlighted
inconsistencies in the court’s prior rulings and suggested that it had
created further confusion by applying the single entity rule
26
differently for system claims. Moreover, Judge Newman seemed to
caution that the unintended consequence of the court’s prior joint
infringement holdings was to devalue the advances in computer27
based technology that have enabled interactive methods.
Approximately one week later, the Federal Circuit vacated Akamai I
28
and granted requests to rehear McKesson and Akamai en banc.
Almost a year later, a six judge majority for the Federal Circuit
reversed its decisions in BMC and Muniauction and held that both
joint infringement cases could be resolved through the application of
the doctrine of induced infringement, leaving several important
29
questions unanswered.
It is no accident that the Federal Circuit’s attention has been
diverted to issues surrounding interactive methods over the past

22. 629 F.3d 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2010), rev’d, 692 F.3d 1301.
23. See id. at 1319 (making explicit the implications of prior holdings that joint
infringement could be perpetrated through an agency or contractual relationship).
24. 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2011), rev’d sub nom. Akamai II, 692
F.3d 1301.
25. See id. at 1284–85 (drawing multiple parallels with Akamai and ultimately
holding in favor of the alleged infringer).
26. Id. at 1290 (Newman, J., dissenting). An interactive system arises when
different users, for example, physically control different interactive elements —a
difficult distinction to make between interactive methods.
See id. at 1290
(summarizing the distinction, contrasting the technical requirements of
performance— where a single entity must control or direct every step—with the
reality that a single entity can still cause and benefit from the process without much
control (citing Centillion Data Sys., LLC v. Qwest Commc’ns Int’l, Inc., 631 F.3d
1279, 1285 (Fed. Cir. 2011))).
27. See id. at 1291 (understating the net effect as “curious” because “the
burgeoning body of interactive computer-managed advances” no longer qualifies for
patent protection).
28. McKesson Techs. Inc. v. Epic Sys. Corp., 463 F. App’x 906, 907 (Fed. Cir.
2011); Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 419 F. App’x 989, 989 (Fed.
Cir. 2011).
29. See Akamai II, 692 F.3d at 1305–07.
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several years. Facebook and Twitter were launched in 2004 and 2006
30
A paradigm shift has occurred in the way humans
respectively.
31
work, play, and design technology: everything is connected. In the
wake of this technological paradigm shift, it is the unenviable job of
the Federal Circuit to apply laws crafted in consideration of 1950’s
32
technology to the cutting edge innovations of today.
Several commentators have suggested that patentees can avoid
33
having to assert joint infringement by drafting better claims.
Unfortunately, given today’s advances in technology, even expert
claim drafting cannot protect patentees from an unauthorized use of
their innovative method. Further, the Federal Circuit’s focus on the
nature of the relationship between relevant actors ignores other
practical factors that should be considered in determining liability for
34
a joint infringement claim. Accordingly, the law should prescribe a
more flexible procedure to analyze joint infringement liability.
The proposed approach suggests that the law impose a two-prong
test for method claim infringement when separate entities each

30. See Facebook, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) 4 (July 26, 2012); Nicholas
Carlson, The Real History of Twitter, BUS. INSIDER, (Apr. 13, 2011), http://articles.
businessinsider.com/2011-04-13/tech/29957143_1_jack-dorsey-twitterpodcasting (reporting Twitter’s launch in fall of 2006).
31. In his book, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Thomas Kuhn argued that
scientific advancement, in one reviewer’s evocative words, “is a series of peaceful
interludes punctuated by intellectually violent revolutions” where one worldview
replaces another. Nicholas Wade, Thomas S. Kuhn: Revolutionary Theorist of Science,
197 SCIENCE 143, 144 (1977). The recent rise and popularity of social media
technologies exhibit this pattern. Social media technologies (e.g., Twitter, Facebook,
Google+) are Internet-based systems for the exchange of information between
multiple users. In addition, social media employ software programs (applications or
“apps”) that facilitate interaction between software and users. In sum, the very
nature of social media and the benefits of its applications rely on the participation of
multiple parties.
32. See Patent Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-593, 66 Stat. 792 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.) (defining patentable subjects).
33. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley et al., Divided Infringment Claims, 33 AIPLA Q.J. 255,
256 (2005) (highlighting the commonality of distributed claims in computer
networking and warning that patent owners will lack a remedy without careful
drafting); Harold C. Wegner, Wordsmithing, Akamai and the “All Elements” Rule, GRAY
ON CLAIMS 4 (Nov. 20, 2011), http://www.grayonclaims.com/storage/
WordsmithingNov20_Version4.pdf (proposing the need for formal drafting
licensure to “protect . . . America’s precious intellectual property”).
34. See, e.g., Golden Hour Data Sys., Inc. v. emsCharts, Inc., 614 F.3d 1367, 1382–
83 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (Newman, J., dissenting) (commenting that the majority’s
holding incorrectly dismisses the defendants’ “strategic partnership” to sell software
in divided units); Thomson-Houston Elec. Co. v. Ohio Brass Co., 80 F. 712, 723 (6th
Cir. 1897) (considering the “certain inference” that the use of the defendant’s
product would infringe the plaintiff’s patent); Wallace v. Holmes, 29 F. Cas. 74, 80
(C.C.D. Conn. 1871) (No. 17,100) (granting an injunction for the plaintiff because
“the actual concert with others is a certain inference” even without “an actual prearrangement with any particular person”).
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35

perform separate steps of a method claim. The first prong of the
test applies to (1) claims directed to a single entity or (2) claims that
36
do not require participation of multiple entities. For these claims,
in addition to the relationship between relevant actors, the law
should consider and weigh several factors such as concerted action,
commercial benefit, intent, and the nature of the activity
37
performed.
The second prong applies to claims that explicitly
38
require participation of multiple entities. Here, the law should only
consider the factors listed above if the patented claim intrinsically
39
requires interactivity. If no nexus exists between the patentability of
the claim and its claimed interactivity, then liability should depend
40
solely on the nature of the relationship between relevant actors.
This Article does not suggest whether Congress, the courts, or both
should enact this change. Regardless of the source, the result —
addressing the peculiarities associated with joint infringement —will
be the same. The approach outlined above will prevent the
misappropriation of patented technology, promote the public-notice
function served by well-crafted claims, and shield innocent actors
from strict liability.
This Article contributes to the joint infringement literature in
several ways. First, it highlights that focusing on inducement or the
relationships between entities ignores other practical factors that the
41
law should consider in determining liability for joint infringement.
Second, it acknowledges that joint infringement can occur multiple
35. See discussion infra Part III.A.
36. See discussion infra Part III.B.
37. See Golden Hour, 614 F.3d at 1382 (Newman, J., dissenting) (discussing joint
infringement in the context of extremely close collaboration); Thomson-Houston Elec.,
80 F. at 723–24 (rejecting contributory infringement and inferences basing
judgment on the limited uses for the final product, i.e., its patented combination);
Wallace, 29 F. Cas. at 80 (concluding the patent did not protect the patentee if two
manufacturers operated in parallel for the common purpose of avoiding
infringement).
38. See discussion infra Part III.C.
39. See Nari Lee, Fragmented Infringement of Computer Program Patents in the Global
Economy, 48 IDEA 345, 349 (2008) (contrasting Internet-based patents whose value
“likely . . . lies in the combinations of steps” against machines or processes merely
connected to a network and arguing that expanding protection of the latter would
be “over-reaching”).
40. See generally Muniauction, Inc. v. Thomson Corp. 532 F.3d 1318 (Fed. Cir.
2008) (relying on the control-or-direction standard for joint infringement claims),
overruled by Akamai II, 692 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (en banc) (per curiam); BMC
Res., Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P., 498 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (focusing on vicarious
liability to find non-infringement), overruled by Akamai II, 692 F.3d 1301.
41. See, e.g., Golden Hour, 614 F.3d at 1382–83 (Newman, J., dissenting)
(criticizing control or direction as too narrow a standard for joint infringement);
Thomson-Houston Elec., 80 F. at 723–24 (focusing on actual concert of infringers);
Wallace, 29 F. Cas. at 80 (same).
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ways and suggests that the rules for determining liability be flexible
42
Third, this
enough to take into account different possibilities.
Article suggests a flexible approach for enforcing interactive method
claims that are truly innovative while protecting innocent actors from
43
infringement liability and placing a premium on well-crafted claims.
Part I of this Article discusses how the doctrine of joint
infringement evolved from the common law. In addition, Part I
discusses the most recent developments concerning the doctrine of
joint infringement. Part II highlights certain factors that suggest that
a more flexible approach to joint infringement is necessary. Finally,
Part III outlines the suggested approach to determine if a method
claim is infringed when separate entities each perform separate steps
of the method claim.
I.

BACKGROUND

In the last five years, the Federal Circuit has struggled with the
44
doctrine of joint infringement. In Akamai I, the Federal Circuit
requested that both parties address (1) the circumstances under
which a method claim would be directly infringed when separate
entities each perform separate steps of the method claim and (2) the
45
extent to which each of the parties would be liable. In McKesson, the
Federal Circuit asked the parties to address two questions: (1) In
which circumstances, if any, would an entity or third party be liable
for inducing infringement or contributory infringement having
separately performed the steps of a method claim, and (2) “[d]oes
the nature of the relationship between the relevant actors—e.g.,
service provider/user; doctor/patient —affect the question of direct
46
or indirect infringement liability?” Thus, the fundamental question
before the Federal Circuit was under what circumstances
42. See discussion infra Part III.
43. See discussion infra Part III.
44. The evolution of the doctrine proceeded from BMC, where the Federal
Circuit considered the question of the proper standard for joint infringement,
having already phrased the district court’s perspective of “[f]inding no law on
point.” 498 F.3d at 1378. In turn, Muniauction, relied on BMC for an “axiomatic”
statement of the law regarding infringement. 532 F.3d at 1328. Golden Hour cited
both Muniauction and BMC for joint infringement doctrine, 614 F.3d at 1380, as did
Akamai I, adding that “BMC Resources established a foundational basis” to determine
joint infringement liability, 629 F.3d 1311, 1318–19 (Fed. Cir. 2010), rev’d, 692 F.3d
1301 (Fed. Cir. 2012). Finally, McKesson incorporated Akamai’s holding with respect
to agency relationships. 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1281, 1283–84 (Fed. Cir. 2011), rev’d
sub nom. Akamai II, 692 F.3d 1301.
45. Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 419 F. App’x 989, 989 (Fed.
Cir. 2011) (per curiam).
46. McKesson Techs. Inc. v. Epic Sys. Corp., 463 F. App’x 906, 907 (Fed. Cir.
2011) (per curiam).
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infringement liability exists when separate entities each perform
47
separate steps of a method claim.
Surprisingly, in the majority’s per curiam opinion, issued on
August 31, 2012, the Federal Circuit failed to answer most of these
48
questions.
Instead, the court explained that the cases could be
resolved through application of the doctrine of induced
infringement and declined to address when direct infringement
49
could be found or opine on the “single entity” doctrine.
By
reframing the issue, the majority sidestepped the main controversy
that gave rise to the appeal. Thus, fundamental questions remain
unanswered.
The joint infringement doctrine was a judicially created exception
rooted in the theory of common law contributory infringement. In
order to place the doctrine in proper context for analysis, this Part
briefly reviews the evolution of the doctrine of contributory
infringement from common law to its codification in the Patent Act
50
of 1952. Next, this Part explains the establishment and application
of the Federal Circuit’s joint infringement standard. Finally, this Part
concludes with a review of the demise of the doctrine of joint
infringement and an introduction of the new inducement-only
standard.
A. Early Law Concerning Patent Infringement
The idea of joint infringement is derived from the doctrine of
51
indirect infringement.
Today, indirect infringement generally
refers to the acts defined under 35 U.S.C. § 271(b), inducing direct
infringement, and 35 U.S.C. § 271(c), contributing to direct
52
infringement. Both provisions impose liability upon parties that aid
47. See McKesson, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1291 (Newman, J., dissenting)
(distilling the question as “identifying the circumstances in which it is just to hold
one individual accountable for the actions of another” (quoting Sony Corp. of Am. v.
Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 435 (1984)) (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
48. See Akamai II, 692 F.3d 1301, 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (en banc) (per curiam).
The Federal Circuit decided the Akamai and McKesson rehearings collectively as
Akamai II. Id. at 1305–06.
49. See id. at 1306.
50. Pub. L. No. 593, 66 Stat. 792 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 35
U.S.C.).
51. See BMC Res., Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P., 498 F.3d 1373, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2007)
(summarizing that a participant in infringement does so either directly or
indirectly), overruled by Akamai II, 692 F.3d 1301.
52. See 5 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS: A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
PATENTABILITY, VALIDITY AND INFRINGEMENT § 17.01, at 17-2 (2011) (overviewing types
of infringement in relation to U.S. Code provisions); see also Dynacore Holdings
Corp. v. U.S. Philips Corp., 363 F.3d 1263, 1274 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (predicating
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53

or abet direct infringement by another party.
Historically, the
common law referred to both types of indirect infringement simply as
54
“contributory infringement.”
Common law contributory infringement was codified by Congress
in the Patent Act of 1952 to address legal issues arising from a
55
common yet, particular set of facts. Specifically, early contributory
infringement cases dealt mostly with fact patterns that involved the
56
sale of an unpatented component in an infringing combination.
Cases were common where one party sold an item that enabled
another party to make or use a patented machine, process, or
57
combination. Therefore, a review of the development of common
law contributory infringement will place the doctrine of joint
infringement in its proper context.
1.

Common law contributory infringement
Before the Patent Act of 1952, courts categorized patent
infringement as (1) direct infringement or (2) contributory
58
infringement under a theory of joint tortfeasance. Although the law
now distinguishes between inducement and contributory
infringement, the two were once the same concept —contributory
59
infringement.
Under this early formulation of contributory
infringement, “one who intentionally caused, or aided and abetted,
the commission of a tort by another was jointly and severally liable
60
with the primary tortfeasor.”
As illustrated below, factors that
assisted early courts in determining contributory infringement were

indirect infringement on initially finding direct infringement). The plaintiff’s
“failure to prove direct infringement . . . necessarily doom[ed] its allegations of
indirect infringement.” Dynacore Holdings, 363 F.3d at 1277.
53. CHISUM, supra note 52, § 17.01, at 17-2.
54. See id. § 17.02, at 17-3 & n.1 (recounting joint tortfeasance and its relation to
35 U.S.C. § 271(b)–(d)).
55. See id. § 17.02[6], at 17-24 (emphasizing that Congress viewed the judicial
doctrine of contributory infringement as an important innovation when it enacted
the Patent Act of 1952).
56. See, e.g., id. § 17.02, at 17-3 (labeling Wallace v. Holmes as the “leading case”
regarding unpatented components assembled into infringing combinations).
57. See Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. 2060, 2066 (2011)
(tracing the dearth of clear case law to the early lack of distinction between such
cases and the less common inducement cases); see also Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch
& Lomb Inc., 909 F.2d 1464, 1469 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (highlighting the most common
scenario involving the 1952 component cases).
58. See Hewlett-Packard, 909 F.2d at 1469.
59. See Global-Tech, 131 S. Ct. at 2066 (“Before 1952, both the conduct now
covered by § 271(b) (induced infringement) and the conduct now addressed by
§ 271(c) (sale of a component of a patented invention) were viewed as falling within
the overarching concept of ‘contributory infringement.’”).
60. Hewlett-Packard, 909 F.2d at 1469.
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concerted action, intent, and the nature of the relationship between
61
the parties.
a.

Concerted action

Before the Patent Act of 1952, most courts adhered to the
principles that (1) whoever uses a patent without permission is an
infringer and (2) whoever contributes to such use is also an
62
63
infringer. Wallace v. Holmes is a notable case that applies common
law principles of joint tortfeasance in the context of patent
64
infringement. The plaintiff in Wallace alleged that the defendants
65
The patent
infringed a patent for an improvement of a lamp.
claimed a burner and a chimney that were combined to form the
66
improved lamp. The defendants asserted that they did not infringe
any of the claims of the patent on the grounds that they only made
67
and sold some of the parts of the lamp. Specifically, the defendants
manufactured the lamp burner and left it to the purchasers of the
68
burner to supply the chimney. The defendants argued that “where
a patent is for a combination merely, it is not infringed by one who
uses one or more of the parts, but not all, to produce the same
69
results, either by themselves, or by the aid of other devices.”
The court acknowledged that the rule articulated by the
70
defendants was well settled. However, the court rejected application
71
of the rule to the facts at issue. Instead, the court stated that if, in
concert, the defendant made the burner and a third party provided
72
the chimney then both parties must be deemed joint infringers.
The court noted that while there was no evidence that the defendants
prearranged with a third party to combine its burner with a chimney,
every sale of the burner made by the defendant was a proposal to the
73
purchaser to supply the chimney.
In turn, the purchaser, by
61. See discussion infra Part I.A.1.a–c.
62. See CHISUM, supra note 52, § 17.02[2], at 17-11 (noting that the Supreme
Court distinguished between “impermissible ‘reconstruction’ rather than ‘repair’”
(quoting Leeds & Catlin Co. v. Victor Talking Mach. Co., 213 U.S. 325, 333 (1909))).
63. 29 F. Cas. 74 (C.C.D. Conn. 1871) (No. 17,100).
64. See CHISUM, supra note 52, § 17.02, at 17-3 (chronicling the evolution of
contributory infringement, starting with Wallace).
65. Wallace, 29 F. Cas. at 77.
66. Id. at 78–79.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 79–80.
69. Id. at 80.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. (emphasizing the codependence of the parts and their usefulness only
when sold together).
73. Id. (recognizing that a burner was of little value without a chimney).
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purchasing the burner, consented to supplying or causing the
74
chimney to be supplied to the burner. Thus, based solely on their
actions, the court concluded that the manufacturer of the burner
and the customer purchasing the burner for combination with a
75
chimney were “active parties to the whole infringement.”
b.

Intent

Alternatively, in other early contributory infringement cases, courts
76
considered the intent of the relevant actors. Generally, these cases
concerned the sale of generic components for use in a patented
77
article. One early case dealing with contributory infringement held
that there must be some intent (inferred or otherwise) on the part of
78
a seller to have the sold article used in an infringing way.
Subsequent cases found no liability where a component sold by an
alleged infringer had other uses in addition to being used in a
79
patented combination.
However, this principle was limited by the Sixth Circuit in Thomson80
Houston Electric Co. v. Ohio Brass Co. The court stated that liability
could be found if the plaintiff affirmatively showed that the
81
defendant-seller intended to assist in the infringement. The court
explained that intent could be shown by knowledge or indifference
82
of the defendant as to the consequences of its act. Later decisions
found contributory infringement where the sale of components was
accompanied by active inducement in the form of instructions,

74. Id.
75. Id.
76. See, e.g., Henry v. A.B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1, 31–32 (1912) (explaining that
while certain generic items can be manufactured, they may not be sold with the
intent to infringe a patent), overruled by Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film
Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917).
77. See id. at 11 (evaluating the sale of ink used in a mimeograph); ThomsonHouston Elec. Co. v. Ohio Brass Co., 80 F. 712, 723 (6th Cir. 1897) (explaining that
the products sold had no innocent use); see also CHISUM, supra note 52, § 17.02[1], at
17-6 (distinguishing innocent use of items from infringing use directed via
advertisement or instruction).
78. See Henry, 224 U.S. at 48 (requiring intent and purpose of use); see also
Thomson-Houston, 80 F. at 723 (determining that it is the duty of a defendant to
ensure that combinations of product used to intentionally infringe be limited to what
is “lawfully organized”); CHISUM, supra note 52, § 17.02[1], at 17-4 to -5 (explaining
that knowledge of infringing use is not required if intent to infringe is present).
79. See CHISUM, supra note 52, § 17.02[1], at 17-4 to -5 (distinguishing those
products that had an innocent use as well as an infringing use).
80. 80 F. 712 (6th Cir. 1897).
81. Id. at 723–24 (drawing an inference of intention where the article could only
be used in patented combination).
82. See id. at 723 (giving a defendant a duty of investigation and inability to be
indifferent as to whether a product will be used in an infringing manner).
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advertising, or other steps indicating the intent of the defendant that
83
the component be used in an infringing fashion.
c.

The relationship between the parties

As early as 1825, the Supreme Court recognized that the
relationship between alleged joint tortfeasors was a factor in
84
determining infringement liability. In Keplinger v. De Young, the
Court agreed with a lower court’s instruction that the defendant did
not infringe because the defendant had no connection with a user of
85
the patented machine other than a purchase contract. However,
the Court acknowledged the possibility that the defendant might be
liable if the claimant could offer evidence of a connection in addition
86
to the purchase contract or a transaction intended to evade the law.
Thus, by inquiring into whether the parties attempted to evade the
law, the Supreme Court suggested it would consider other factors
related to how or why infringement occurred in addition to the
87
relationship between relevant actors.
In sum, early courts considered the actions of the parties, intent of
the parties, and the nature of the relationship between the parties
when determining whether more than one party infringed a patent.
88
Congress codified the common law in the Patent Act of 1952. While
some of the general principles established by the courts remained,
89
Congress narrowed their application to specific situations.
2.

The Patent Act of 1952
The Patent Act of 1952 maintained the common law category of
direct infringement and contributory infringement, and clarified

83. See Weed Chain Tire Grip Co. v. Cleveland Chain & Mfg. Co., 196 F. 213, 215
(C.C.N.D. Ohio 1910) (holding the defendant liable for infringement when he sold
products with attached tag including instructions); Holly v. Vergennes Mach. Co., 4
F. 74, 82 (C.C.D. Vt. 1880) (concluding that providing a patented product for an
infringing purpose made defendants liable as infringers); CHISUM, supra note 52,
§ 17.02[1], at 17-6 & n.8 (specifying cases in which patented articles sold alongside
instructions were found to be active inducement).
84. 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 358 (1825).
85. See id. at 365 (pivoting the decision on the contractual relationship between
the plaintiff and defendant).
86. See id. at 366 (emphasizing that the jury had sufficient latitude as instructed
to find infringement if more nefarious circumstances had manifested).
87. See id. (declining to investigate such questions because they were not before
the Court).
88. Pub. L. No. 82-593, 66 Stat. 792 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
35 U.S.C.); see CHISUM, supra note 52, § 17.02[6], at 17-24 (clarifying that the purpose
of codification was to eliminate doubt and confusion).
89. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(b)–(c) (2006) (limiting the scope of the section by using
the words “knowing” and “actively”).
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their definitions. The Patent Act defines direct infringement as the
90
unauthorized making, using, or selling of the patented invention.
Contributory infringement was originally defined judicially as any
activity other than direct infringement where the defendant
91
“displayed sufficient culpability to be held liable as an infringer.”
Section 271(b)–(d) of the Patent Act is directed to contributory
92
infringement.
Section 271 separates common law contributory
infringement into two categories, one covered by § 271(b) and the
93
other covered by § 271(c).
Section 271(a)–(c), as it is currently written, reads as follows:
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this title, whoever without
authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention,
within the United States or imports into the United States any
patented invention during the term of the patent therefor,
infringes the patent.
(b) Whoever actively induces infringement of a patent shall be
liable as an infringer.
(c) Whoever offers to sell or sells within the United States or
imports into the United States a component of a patented
machine, manufacture, combination or composition, or a material
or apparatus for use in practicing a patented process, constituting a
material part of the invention, knowing the same to be especially
made or especially adapted for use in an infringement of such
patent, and not a staple article or commodity of commerce suitable
for substantial noninfringing use, shall be liable as a contributory
94
infringer.

The remainder of this Part will focus on § 271(b) and (c).
a.

Inducement

Section 271(b) states that “[w]hoever actively induces
95
infringement of a patent shall be liable as an infringer.” Section
271(b) codifies the case law developed prior to 1952 on contributory
infringement other than infringement caused by the sale of a
90. Id. § 271(a) (“Except as otherwise provided in this title, whoever without
authority makes, uses, offers, to sell, or sells any patented invention . . . .”).
91. Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb Inc., 909 F.2d 1464, 1469 (Fed. Cir.
1990) (outlining the history of direct and indirect infringement).
92. 35 U.S.C. § 271(b)–(d).
93. Id. § 271(b)–(c); see also Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct.
2060, 2067 (2011) (highlighting that both actively inducing infringement and
importing or offering to sell a component of a patented device with the knowledge
that such a component is not a commerce commodity will constitute contributory
infringement).
94. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a)–(c).
95. Id. § 271(b).
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component especially adapted for infringing use.
Under this
provision, liability exists if an inducer specifically intends to cause,
97
Broadly
urge, encourage or aid another to infringe a patent.
speaking, Congress intended for § 271(b) to impose infringement
98
liability on anyone who aids or abets infringement. In subsequent
cases under § 271(b), courts enforced but did not expand “the judgemade doctrine of contributory infringement under which a person
who knowingly aids, encourages or abets the direct infringement of a
99
patent is to be held liable as a contributory infringer.”
b.

Contributory infringement

Section 271(c) concerns the sale or importation into the United
States of “a component of a patented machine, manufacture,
combination or composition, or a material or apparatus for use in
practicing a patented process, constituting a material part of the
100
invention.”
Here, if the seller knows that the component is
“especially made or especially adapted for use in an infringement of
such patent” and the component is “not a staple article or
commodity of commerce suitable for substantial non-infringing use”
101
then the seller is liable as a contributory infringer.
Section 271(c) concerns, what was at the time, the most common
102
form of contributory infringement. That is, Congress intended for
§ 271(c) to apply to parties who sold a component of a patented
invention for use in that invention. If the alleged defendant did not
103
sell the component then § 271(c) does not apply. In its application,
courts held suppliers of replacement parts, designed for use in
104
repairing infringing articles, liable for contributory infringement.

96. See CHISUM, supra note 52, § 17.02[6], at 17-24 (clarifying that the purpose of
codification was to eliminate doubt and confusion).
97. Id. § 17.01, at 17-2.
98. See S. REP. NO. 82-1979, at 28 (1952) (declaring the purpose of the 1952
amendment).
99. See Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 365 U.S. 336, 348
(1961) (Black, J., concurring) (reviewing the legislative history in its application of
indirect infringement).
100. 35 U.S.C. § 271(c).
101. Id.; CHISUM, supra note 52, § 17.01, at 17-2.
102. See S. Rep. No. 82-1979, at 28 (characterizing § 271(c) as applying to “one
who sells a component part of a patented invention or material or apparatus for use
therein”).
103. See Jones v. Radio Corp. of Am., 131 F. Supp. 82, 83–84 (S.D.N.Y. 1955)
(explaining that in light of the legislative history of the 1952 Act, § 271(c) does not
apply if the defendant did not sell a component of the patented combination).
104. See Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476, 485–86
(1964) (stressing that such instances exemplified the types of case law results that
§ 271(c) was intended to codify); Union Tool Co. v. Wilson, 259 U.S. 107, 113–14
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Thus, § 271(c) codified the law concerning the common, pre-1952
contributory infringement case where “a seller would sell a
component which was not itself technically covered by the claims of a
product or process patent but had no other use except with the
105
claimed product or process.”
c.

Judicially created doctrines and clarifications

Through the process of applying § 271, the courts established
several judicially created doctrines. For example, the “all limitations”
or “all elements” rule states that the patented invention is defined by
106
Courts
each and every limitation of the claim being asserted.
established that the initial question regarding the issue of
infringement is whether the accused device or method falls within
107
the literal scope of the language of the claims.
A device “literally
infringes” a claim when every limitation of the claim can be found in
108
the accused device.
If literal infringement is established, that is
109
normally the end of the inquiry.
A second doctrine the courts established was the doctrine of
equivalents. The doctrine of equivalents provides that an infringer
may not pirate an invention simply by avoiding the literal language of
110
a claim. To infringe under the doctrine of equivalents, an accused
method or device must include each and every step or element of a

(1922) (holding that the sale of spare parts for use in patented machines was an
infringing use).
105. Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb Inc., 909 F.2d 1464, 1469 (Fed. Cir.
1990).
106. BMC Res., Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P., 498 F.3d 1373, 1378–79 (Fed. Cir. 2007)
(“Direct infringement requires a party to perform or use each and every step or
element of a claimed method or product.”), overruled by Akamai II, 692 F.3d 1301
(Fed. Cir. 2012) (en banc) (per curiam); Canton Bio-Med., Inc. v. Integrated Liner
Techs., Inc., 216 F.3d 1367, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“Infringement of process
inventions is subject to the ‘all-elements rule’ whereby each of the claimed steps of a
patented process must be performed in an infringing process, literally or by an
equivalent of that step, with due attention to the role of each step in the context of
the patented invention.”).
107. See Canton Bio-Med., 216 F.3d at 1370 (explaining that infringement of a
method can occur by a literally infringing process, or by an equivalent of the claimed
steps).
108. Lantech, Inc. v. Keip Mach. Co., 32 F.3d 542, 546–47 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
109. See Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 607 (1950)
(articulating that the first step in assessing the validity of a patent infringement claim
is to look to the actual words of the claim and assess whether the accused device or
component clearly falls within the claim).
110. See id. (explaining that the doctrine of equivalents must be applied to
individual elements of the claim rather than to the invention as a whole, thus
ensuring proper patent protection).
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111

claim or its equivalent.
These doctrines work together. For
example, under both literal infringement and the doctrine of
equivalents, the “all elements” rule still requires that for there to be
use of a patented invention, an entity must practice each and every
112
step, or its equivalent, of a claimed method.
Recently, the Supreme Court clarified that § 271(b) and (c)
require an accused infringer to have knowledge of the infringed
113
patent in Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A.
In Global-Tech, the
Supreme Court explained that § 271(b) and (c) have the same
knowledge requirement: That the accused have knowledge of the
114
patent’s existence.
That is, both subsections require that the
defendant knew that the induced acts would constitute patent
115
infringement. In addition to clarifying the knowledge requirement,
the Court also determined that § 271(b) required the alleged
infringer to take affirmative steps to lead, prevail, move by
116
persuasion, or influence another to infringe a patent.
d.

Summary

Section 271(b) and (c) were codified to cover specific examples of
contributory infringement. Since 1952, the courts have created
117
doctrines within the scope of § 271, and Congress has amended the
118
However, neither § 271 nor
section to close loopholes in the law.
111. Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 29 (1997)
(stating that “[e]ach element contained in a patent claim is deemed material to
defining the scope of the patented invention, and thus the doctrine of equivalents
must be applied to individual elements of the claim”). “[T]he doctrine of
equivalents is not a license to ignore or ‘erase . . . structural and functional
limitations of the claim,’ limitations ‘on which the public is entitled to rely in
avoiding infringement.’” Athletic Alternatives, Inc. v. Prince Mfg., Inc., 73 F.3d
1573, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (quoting Perkin-Elmer Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec.
Corp., 822 F.2d 1528, 1532 (Fed. Cir. 1987)). Thus, if a claim element is completely
missing from an accused device (that is, the claim element is not literally present in
the device, and the equivalent to the claim element is not present), then there can
be no infringement under the doctrine of equivalents as a matter of law. WarnerJenkinson, 520 U.S. at 40. This is the so-called “all elements” rule.
112. See Muniauction, Inc. v. Thomson Corp., 532 F.3d 1318, 1328 (Fed. Cir.
2008) (restating the “all elements” rule as laid out in BMC), overruled by Akamai II,
692 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (en banc) (per curiam).
113. 131 S. Ct. 2060 (2011).
114. Id. at 2068 (“In light of the ‘special force’ of the doctrine of stare decisis with
regard to questions of statutory interpretation, we proceed on the premise that
§ 271(c) requires knowledge of the existence of the patent that is infringed. Based
on this premise, it follows that the same knowledge is needed for induced
infringement under § 271(b).” (citation omitted)).
115. Id. at 2068.
116. Id. at 2065 (interpreting § 271(b) despite absence of an explicit “intent”
requirement but rather an “induce” requirement).
117. See discussion infra Part II.B.
118. For example, § 271(f) was created to cover infringement by exporting the
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the judicial doctrines that fall within its framework are fully
comprehensive. This has become clearer as courts struggle to apply
§ 271 in recent cases involving interactive methods.
B. Joint Infringement
In 2007, the Federal Circuit had its first opportunity to hear a case
in which the patentee asserted infringement based on a theory of
119
joint infringement in BMC. Although the Federal Circuit affirmed
the lower court’s finding of non-infringement, it used the occasion to
120
A year later, the Federal
establish the “control or direction” test.
Circuit further clarified this joint infringement standard in
Muniauction by finding that no infringement occurred where the
actions of the secondary actor were not done on behalf of the
121
primary actor. In the years following BMC and Muniauction, district
courts struggled to apply the direction or control test in various
122
Finally, on August 31, 2012, a fractured Federal
factual scenarios.
Circuit overruled BMC and Muniauction, holding that there can be
liability for induced infringement where all the steps are not
123
performed by a single entity.
1.

The genesis of the joint infringement doctrine
In BMC, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit sought to
clarify “the proper standard for whether a method claim is directly
124
infringed by the combined actions of multiple parties.”
In this
infringement action, BMC asserted two patents that disclosed a
method requiring the combined action of several distinct
125
participants.
The patents claimed a method for providing an
interface between a standard touch-tone telephone and a debit card
network in order to process debit transactions without using a PIN

components of a patented invention and assembling them abroad. 35 U.S.C.
§ 271(f) 2006).
119. BMC Res., Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P., 498 F.3d 1373, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2007),
overruled by Akamai II, 692 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (en banc) (per curiam).
120. Id. at 1380–81 (acknowledging that a standard possibly resulting in armslength agreements to avoid infringement did not outweigh concerns over expanding
the law surrounding direct infringement).
121. Muniauction, Inc. v. Thomson Corp., 532 F.3d 1318, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2008),
overruled by Akamai II, 692 F.3d 1301.
122. See generally Alice Juwon Ahn, Finding Vicarious Liability in U.S. Patent Law: The
“Control or Direction” Standard for Joint Infringement, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 149 (2009)
(discussing that the amount of control or direction necessary to trigger liability is still
unclear and reviewing district court decisions attempting to apply the test).
123. Akamai II, 692 F.3d at 1306.
124. Muniauction, 532 F.3d at 1329 (reviewing the analysis in BMC).
125. BMC, 498 F.3d at 1375.
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126

number.
To carry out the transaction, the patented method
required participation from a customer, debit network, and financial
127
institution.
The accused infringer, Paymentech, provided financial transaction
processing services to its merchant clients who collected payment
128
information from customers and sent it to Paymentech.
Paymentech sent that information to a participating debit network
129
who forwarded the information to an affiliated financial institution.
The financial institution authorized or declined the transaction and
sent transaction status information back to Paymentech via the debit
130
network.
BMC demanded that Paymentech obtain a license to use its
patented technology when it learned of Paymentech’s plans to
131
provide services to BMC’s clients. As a result, Paymentech filed suit
in federal district court seeking a declaration of non-infringement
132
with respect to the BMC patents. BMC counterclaimed and alleged
that Paymentech directly infringed one method claim in each of U.S.
Patent Numbers 5,718,298 (the ‘298 patent) and 5,870,456 (the ‘456
133
patent).
In support of its motion for summary judgment, Paymentech
argued that it did not perform all of the steps of the patented method
134
alone or in concert with its customers.
In response, BMC argued
that under the Federal Circuit’s decision in On Demand Machine Corp.
135
v. Ingram Industries, Inc., a plaintiff must show “participation and
combined action” on the part of the alleged infringer as the type of
136
“connection” needed to prove joint infringement. BMC concluded
that Paymentech infringed the asserted claims under the
137
“participation and combined action” standard.
The district court disagreed with BMC and found that Paymentech
would only infringe the claims if the record showed that it directed or
controlled the behavior of the financial institutions that performed
126. Id.
127. Id. at 1375–76.
128. Id. at 1375.
129. Id. at 1376.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 1375–76.
134. Id. at 1377.
135. 442 F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
136. BMC, 498 F.3d at 1380 (quoting On Demand, 442 F.3d at 1331) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
137. See id. at 1380 (arguing that On Demand had changed the law for joint
infringement and that Paymentech’s actions thus qualified as infringement).
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138

those claimed method steps that Paymentech itself did not perform.
Since the record did not contain any evidence of direction or control,
the district court granted Paymentech’s motion for summary
139
judgment.
On appeal, the Federal Circuit also rejected BMC’s argument
140
Instead, the Federal Circuit stated
regarding joint infringement.
that “[w]hen a defendant . . . does not directly infringe a patent, the
normal recourse under the law is for the court to apply the standards
141
for liability under indirect infringement.”
The court went on to
explain that a finding of indirect infringement requires that a party
amongst the accused actors has committed the entire act of direct
142
infringement.
Relying on the past decisions of other courts, the Federal Circuit
refused to find joint liability where one party did not control or direct
143
each step of the patented process.
However, in cases where a
mastermind had a third party carry out one or more steps of a claim,
the court stated that the party in control would be liable for direct
144
infringement.
In its opinion, the Federal Circuit refused to expand the doctrine
of joint infringement to cover the independent conduct of multiple
actors and acknowledged that this created a loophole where parties
could enter into arms-length agreements to avoid infringement
145
under the control or direction standard.
Instead of judicially
closing this loophole, the court suggested that this concern could be
addressed by patentees drafting method claims capturing the
146
infringement of a single entity.
The Federal Circuit concluded that Paymentech did not infringe
147
under its newly minted control or direction standard.
The court
138. See id. at 1378 (rejecting the On Demand language as dicta and finding no
other district court decisions that followed a changed rule for joint infringement).
139. See id. (finding that even under a looser standard, Paymentech would still not
infringe the patent claims according to the facts in the record).
140. See id. at 1380 (concluding that On Demand did not change the standard for
joint infringement).
141. Id. at 1379.
142. Id.
143. See id. at 1380 (citing district court decisions that did not find infringement in
arms-length agreements and divided performance situations).
144. See id. at 1381 (arguing that contracting out steps to specifically avoid
infringement would still result in liability for the mastermind).
145. See id. (noting that expanding the standard to avoid the arms-length
agreement loophole would not outweigh concerns over expanding the rule beyond
the statutory language).
146. See id. (arguing that BMC could have avoided the claim by drafting its patent
so that each step did not require a different actor).
147. See id.
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noted that (1) there was no evidence that Paymentech provided its
customers or financial institutions with instructions or directions for
148
the use of the data it provided, and (2) the record contained no
evidence of a contractual relationship between Paymentech and the
149
financial institutions.
Thus, without evidence of direction or
control of both the debit networks and the financial institutions, the
Federal Circuit concluded that Paymentech did not perform or cause
150
to be performed each and every element of the claims.
2.

The multi-party spectrum defined
One year later in Muniauction, the Federal Circuit modified the
151
In
direction or control standard to an “on behalf of” standard.
Muniauction, the patentee asserted that the defendant, Thomson,
152
infringed its patent under a theory of joint infringement.
The
patent claimed a method for conducting an auction of financial
153
instruments over a network using a web browser. Thomson owned
the accused process, which allowed users to issue bids over a network
154
using a web browser. A jury found that Thomson willfully infringed
155
On appeal, the Federal Circuit addressed
Muniauction’s claims.
whether the action of the bidder and auctioneer could be combined
156
to give rise to a finding of direct infringement by the auctioneer.
The Federal Circuit described the fact scenarios under which joint
157
infringement had been asserted as a “multi-party spectrum.”
At
one end of the spectrum, a claim is directly infringed “if one party
exercises ‘control or direction’ over the entire process such that every
158
step is attributable to the controlling party, i.e., the ‘mastermind.’”
At the other end of the spectrum, a claim would not be directly
148. See id. at 1381–82 (rejecting BMC’s argument that the instructions could be
inferred from the data provision).
149. See id. at 1382.
150. See id.
151. See Muniauction, Inc. v. Thomson Corp., 532 F.3d 1318, 1330 (Fed. Cir.
2008) (building on the direction or control standard articulated in BMC, namely that
the control of access to a system is not sufficient to incur liability), overruled by Akamai
II, 692 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (en banc) (per curiam); see also Ken Hobday,
Comment, The Incredibly Ever-Shrinking Theory of Joint Infringement: Multi-Actor Method
Claims, 38 CAP. U. L. REV. 137, 140–41 (2009) (arguing that the “on behalf of”
standard goes unnecessarily beyond the BMC standard).
152. Muniauction, 532 F.3d at 1323.
153. Id. at 1321–23 (explaining that the patent was for a process whereby the
municipality offered bonds to underwriters who then bid on and purchased the
offering and resold the individual bonds to the public).
154. Id. at 1323.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 1328–29.
157. Id. at 1329.
158. Id.
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infringed if there was only evidence of “mere ‘arms-length
cooperation’” between multiple parties that in combination
159
performed every step of a claimed method.
Having set forth these boundaries, the court opined that one
160
factual scenario in which the control or direction standard would
be satisfied is “where the law would traditionally hold the accused
direct infringer vicariously liable for the acts committed by another
party that are required to complete performance of a claimed
161
method.” Under this framework, the court decided that Thomson
did not infringe the asserted claims since Thomson did not have
162
another party perform steps of the method claim on its behalf.
Furthermore, the Federal Circuit stated that evidence that Thomson
controlled access to the system and instructed bidders on its use was
163
insufficient to incur liability for direct infringement.
Thus, in
Muniauction, the Federal Circuit narrowed the joint infringement
164
doctrine articulated in BMC.
3.

Application of the direction or control test
Following BMC and Muniauction, several district courts applied the
direction or control test to various factual scenarios with generally
165
predictable results.
In evaluating the relationships between the

159. Id.
160. Presumably the court left the door open for other scenarios.
161. Muniauction, 532 F.3d at 1330.
162. Id.
163. See id. (finding the evidence insufficient under the BMC “control or
direction” standard).
164. See Hobday, supra note 151, at 140–41 (arguing that Muniauction’s added
requirement that the alleged infringer’s actions must violate traditional
requirements for vicarious liability narrows the BMC standard).
165. See, e.g., Am. Patent Dev. Corp. v. Movielink, LLC, 637 F. Supp. 2d 224, 237
(D. Del. 2009) (denying a motion for summary judgment because there was a
question of material fact as to Movielink’s control over its downloaded movie
programs); Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 614 F. Supp. 2d 90, 122–
23 (D. Mass. 2009) (ruling that Limelight did not infringe upon Akamai’s content
delivery process because the customer was required to perform a step of Limelight’s
process and that step was not a contractual obligation for using Limelight’s services),
aff’d, 629 F.3d 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2010), rev’d en banc, per curiam, 692 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir.
2012); Emtel, Inc. v. Lipidlabs, Inc., 583 F. Supp. 2d 811, 838 (S.D. Tex. 2008)
(holding that contracts requiring physicians performing remote diagnoses as part of
a patented “telemedicine” system to get insurance, follow professional standards,
and schedule on-call times merely set basic parameters and were insufficient to prove
control); Global Patent Holdings, LLC v. Panthers BRHC LLC, 586 F. Supp. 2d 1331,
1332–33, 1335 (S.D. Fla. 2008) (finding no infringement when remote users of
Global Patent’s Remote Query Communication System downloaded files from the
system because Global Patent could not prove the users were directed or controlled
by Panthers even though the downloaded material was used to render material for
Panthers’ website), aff’d per curiam, 318 F. App’x 908 (Fed. Cir. 2009). See generally W.
Keith Robinson, Ramifications of Joint Infringement Theory on Emerging Technology
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parties involved, most courts found that the factual situations with
which they were presented did not satisfy the control or direction
166
It is unclear whether the outcome of these cases would
standard.
change under the newly minted inducement-only rule. However, the
lack of fact patterns that satisfied the control or direction test most
167
likely played a part in its demise.
For example, evidence of mere guidance or instruction is
168
insufficient to satisfy the direction or control standard.
In Global
169
Patent Holdings, LLC v. Panthers BHRC LLC, the U.S. District Court
for the Southern District of Florida stated that the Federal Circuit did
not intend for evidence of mere guiding or instructing conduct in
some of the steps of a method claim to satisfy the direction or control
170
standard.
Instead, the district court stated that a contractual
obligation or other relationship that gave rise to vicarious liability
171
Similarly,
must exist to warrant a finding of joint infringement.
other courts have found that “[g]iving instructions or prompts to the
third party in its performance of the steps necessary to complete
infringement, or facilitating or arranging for the third-party’s
involvement in the alleged infringement, are not sufficient” evidence
172
of “direction or control.”
In applying the control or direction test, other courts have
explained that a contract, by itself, is still not sufficient for a finding
of direction or control. Generally, district courts have found that
evidence of a contract for services between a content provider and a
customer and instructions on how to use those services is not
173
sufficient evidence of direction or control.
Instead, even where a
Patents, 18 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 335 (2010) (discussing in-depth how courts have
applied BMC and Muniauction).
166. See, e.g., Global Patent, 586 F. Supp. 2d at 1335 (“[T]he court indicated that
the third party must perform the steps of the patented process by virtue of a
contractual obligation or other relationship that gives rise to vicarious liability in
order for a court to find ‘direction or control.’”).
167. Akamai II, 692 F.3d at 1307.
168. See id.
169. 586 F. Supp. 2d 1331 (S.D. Fla. 2008), aff’d per curiam, 318 F. App’x 908 (Fed.
Cir. 2009).
170. See id. at 1335 (citing BMC Res., Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P., 498 F.3d 1373 (Fed.
Cir. 2007), overruled by Akamai II, 692 F.3d 1301).
171. Id.
172. Emtel, Inc. v. Lipidlabs, Inc., 583 F. Supp. 2d 811, 834 (S.D. Tex. 2008)
(finding that video conferencing network link providers did not infringe on a patent
for “telemedicine” services because the physicians remotely linked to the remote
patient had to perform the medical diagnoses and care instructions, thereby
removing one step of the process from the network providers).
173. See, e.g., Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 614 F. Supp. 2d 90,
121 (D. Mass. 2009) (explaining that Muniauction requires evidence beyond an armslength agreement to show direction and control), aff’d, 629 F.3d 1311 (Fed. Cir.
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contract may exist, courts have indicated that evidence that the
accused party directed or controlled how a third party performed the
steps of a method claim may also be required for a finding of
174
direction and control.
In contrast, the court in American Patent Development Corp. v.
175
Movielink, LLC, stated that evidence of software running on a third
party system that was continuously controlled by an accused infringer
may be sufficient to support a claim for infringement under a joint
176
infringement theory.
Here, one of the asserted patents was
directed to a system for limiting the use of a downloaded video
program purchased by a customer from a “central station” that
177
transmits a “video product” to a customer at a “user site.”
The
claims at issue were methods for limiting the customer’s access to the
178
video programming based on predetermined viewing limits.
American Patent Development Corporation (“APDC”) asserted,
under a joint infringement theory, that Movielink infringed its
179
claims.
APDC noted that in order to use the accused Movielink
service, a customer must have Movielink Manager software installed
180
on the computer.
In response, Movielink argued that it “did not
control its customers’ computers, or the software running on
181
In response, the district court rejected Movielink’s
them.”
arguments.
The court noted that in Movielink’s product
documentation, the Movielink Manager was described as being
tightly integrated with its server software, and was repeatedly depicted
182
as a component in a larger Movielink product offering.
Further,
the court noted that Movielink had the capacity to revoke customer

2010), rev’d, 692 F.3d 1301; Gammino v. Cellco P’ship, 527 F. Supp. 2d 395, 398 (E.D.
Pa. 2007) (noting that parties cannot contract around steps to avoid infringement
charges but finding insufficient evidence of control because the contracting party
did not know how the third party performed the step).
174. See Emtel, 583 F. Supp. 2d at 833 (noting that district courts after Muniauction
specifically require evidence of performance according to the defendant’s
instructions and not merely performance “prompted or facilitated” by the
defendant).
175. 637 F. Supp. 2d 224 (D. Del. 2009).
176. See id. at 236 (denying summary judgment due to the sufficient evidence in
the record suggesting continuing control).
177. Id. at 227.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 236 (emphasizing Movielink’s attempt to demonstrate that control
required a showing of ability “to fundamentally manage or influence the functioning
of the thing allegedly being controlled”).
182. See id. at 237 (noting that these characteristics influenced the court’s
interpretation of the level of control).
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183

licenses through use of the Movielink Manager.
Thus, the court
concluded that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to
whether Movielink exercised continuing control over the software
184
running on the customers’ computer.
In addition, district courts have found that evidence that an alleged
infringer caused third parties to perform in accordance with specific
instructions and requirements may be sufficient to support a claim
185
for joint infringement. In Emtel, Inc. v. Lipidlabs, Inc., the court
reviewed several district court cases heard after BMC and Muniauction
186
for guidance.
The court noted that in several cases, the alleged
infringer provided precise specifications or requirements for
187
performing steps of the claimed method. In these cases, the court
granted summary judgment under a theory of joint infringement
where there was insufficient evidence of specific instruction to
188
control third party performance.
In sum, the initial standard for joint infringement was set forth in
BMC and Muniauction. In most cases, courts applying BMC or
Muniauction did not find that there was evidence of direction or
control or an agency relationship between potential infringing
parties. A handful of districts found otherwise; however, these rulings
would later be called into question by the Federal Circuit’s
189
application of the “single entity” rule.
4.

The “single entity” rule
The “single entity ” rule states that direct infringement under
§ 271(a) requires a showing that a single party practiced each and
190
every element of the claimed invention.
The single entity rule is
183. See id. (identifying the ability to revoke licensures as the “most compelling”
evidence of control).
184. See id. at 237 (denying Movielink’s motion for summary judgment).
185. 583 F. Supp. 2d 811 (S.D. Tex. 2008).
186. See id. at 833–34 (reviewing Global Patent Holdings, LLC v. Panthers BRHC
LLC, 586 F. Supp. 2d 1331 (S.D. Fla. 2008), aff’d per curiam, 318 F. App’x 908 (Fed.
Cir. 2009), and Rowe Int’l Corp. v. Ecast, Inc., 586 F. Supp. 2d 924 (N.D. Ill. 2008)).
187. See id. (highlighting the defendant’s supply of “javascript programs and htmlbased web material” in Global Patent and the technical requirements for jukebox
hardware manufacturers specific to the plaintiff’s jukebox system in Rowe as the
alleged specific instructions).
188. See id. at 834 (contrasting the granting of summary judgment in Global Patent,
where there was no contractual obligation for the third party to perform, with the
jury finding of direction and control in Rowe, where the plaintiff provided specific
technical requirements and directions for performance).
189. See infra Part I.B.4.
190. See BMC Res., Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P., 498 F.3d 1373, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2007)
(“Infringement requires, as it always has, a showing that a defendant has practiced
each and every element of the claimed invention.”), overruled by Akamai II, 692 F.3d
1301 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (en banc) (per curiam).
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closely related to the “all limitations” rule and is used in direct
191
infringement determinations. One commentator has asserted that
the “single entity” or “single actor” rule is a corollary to the “all
limitations” rule and that the “whoever” in the language of § 271
192
refers to only a single, individual entity.
Thus, under the “single
entity” rule, “whoever” refers to only a single, individual entity for
the purposes of direct infringement.
Direct infringement requires a party to perform or use each and
193
every step or element of a claimed method or product. Since direct
infringement is a strict liability offense, a showing of intent or
194
knowledge of the patent is not required.
That is, under direct
infringement, independent creation is not a defense and the
195
infringement may be unintentional and inadvertent.
BMC held that indirect infringement (inducement and
contributory infringement) requires a finding that a party amongst
the accused actors has committed the entire act of direct
196
infringement. Further, to succeed in an action for inducement or
contributory infringement, BMC held that a plaintiff must first show
197
that direct infringement under § 271(a) has occurred. In Akamai II
191. See Joshua P. Larsen, Seminar Article, Liability for Divided Performance of Process
Claims After BMC Resources, Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P., 19 D E P AUL J. A RT T ECH .
& INTELL. PROP. L. 41, 49–50 (2008) (examining the importance of the “all
limitations” rule, which defined the scope of a patent by requiring the performance
of each step to prove infringement).
192. See id. at 50–51 (arguing that the “single actor” and “all limitations” rules act
as corollaries for direct infringement cases); see also 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2006)
(“[W]hoever without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented
invention, . . . infringes the patent.”); BMC, 498 F.3d at 1378–79 (“Direct
infringement requires a party to perform or use each and every step or element of a
claimed method or product. For process patent or method patent claims,
infringement occurs when a party performs all of the steps of the process.” (citations
omitted)).
193. See Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 40 (1997)
(requiring an “objective inquiry on an element-by-element basis”); Joy Techs., Inc. v.
Flakt, Inc., 6 F.3d 770, 773 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (finding that merely selling the
equipment to perform the step in a process is insufficient to prove infringement and
requiring the infringer to perform the process as well).
194. See Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1519
(Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc) (per curiam), rev’d on other grounds, 520 U.S. 17. The
infringer does not even have to know of the existence of the patent. See id. (noting
that knowledge may be considered as part of damages but not liability for
infringement).
195. See Blair v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 291 F. Supp. 664, 670 (D.D.C. 1968)
(emphasizing that independent design elements or modifications may show the
infringer intended to avoid liability), aff’d per curiam sub nom. Blair v. Dowd’s, Inc. 438
F.2d 136 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
196. BMC Res., Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P., 498 F.3d 1373, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2007)
(citing Dynacore Holdings Corp. v. U.S. Philips Corp., 363 F.3d 1263, 1272 (Fed. Cir.
2004)), overruled by Akamai II, 692 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (en banc) (per curiam).
197. Id. at 1380.
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the Federal Circuit overruled the portion of BMC that applied the
“single entity” rule to the determination of infringement based on an
198
However, it is important to note that the
inducement theory.
Federal Circuit’s decision in Akamai II seems to have left the single
199
entity rule intact with respect to direct infringement.
In formulating the “single entity” rule, the court in BMC relied on
language in several cases that was not necessarily applicable to
200
identifying a single infringer.
For example, Warner-Jenkinson Co. v.
201
Hilton Davis Chemical Co. stands for the proposition that the
doctrine of equivalents, like literal infringement, must be tested
202
element by element.
Courts have repeatedly held that a process
203
In
claim is directly infringed when the process is performed.
204
Dennison Manufacturing Co. v. Ben Clements & Sons, Inc., the court
stated that the test of infringement is whether the claimed process is
205
utilized by the infringer. Accordingly, none of these cases explicitly
state that “a single entity” must perform each and every step of a
claimed method to be a direct infringer.
Further, in an attempt to weaken the “single entity” rule, one
amici curiae in Akamai II asserted that the word “whoever” in § 271
206
can mean more than one person.
Statutory interpretation may
indirectly support this definition. Specifically, “whoever invents”
207
refers to more than one inventor. Further, 1 U.S.C. § 1 states that
words importing the singular include and apply to several persons,
198. Akamai II, 692 F.3d at 1306.
199. Id. (stating that there can be liability for induced infringement where all the
steps are not performed by a single entity).
200. See BMC, 498 F.3d at 1378 (evaluating the facts under a looser standard and
coming to the same conclusion).
201. 520 U.S. 17 (1997).
202. Id. at 40 (“The determination of equivalence should be applied as an
objective inquiry on an element-by-element basis.”).
203. Dennison Mfg. Co. v. Ben Clements & Sons, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 391 (S.D.N.Y.
1979); see Joy Techs., Inc. v. Flakt, Inc., 6 F.3d 770, 773 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (“The sale of
the apparatus in Standard Havens was not a direct infringement because a method or
process claim is directly infringed only when the process is performed.”); see also Atl.
Thermoplastics Co. v. Faytex Corp., 970 F.2d 834, 836 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (holding that
a defendant who did not manufacture a product could not infringe a product-byprocess claim).
204. 467 F. Supp. 391 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
205. Id. at 427 (“To be a direct infringer of the method claims, defendant must be
found to have used the attachments in question in the manner prescribed in the
method claims.”).
206. Brief of Amicus Curiae Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of
America on Rehearing En Banc in Support of Neither Party, Akamai II, 692 F.3d 1301
(Fed. Cir. 2012) (en banc) (per curiam) (No. 2010-1291), 2011 WL 3101831, at *18–
19 [hereinafter Amicus Brief for Neither Party] (arguing that “whoever” in § 271(a)
must be able to mean more than one person).
207. See id. (asserting that 1 U.S.C. § 1 and common dictionary definitions strongly
suggest that “whoever” must have a possible plural interpretation).
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208

parties, or things.
Accordingly, one could conclude that the word
209
“whoever” should not be limited to mean a single entity.
Despite the “all elements” and “single entity” rules seemingly
requiring the identification of a single infringer for direct
infringement, courts have recognized that some form of joint
infringement may occur and therefore joint liability should be
assigned. For example, the court in Heaton-Peninsular Button-Fastener
210
Co. v. Eureka Specialty Co. stated that when patent infringement is
brought about by a “concert of action,” all parties engaged directly
211
and intentionally are joint infringers.
In addition, several courts
have recognized that joint liability may be imposed when
infringement is the result of the participation and combined actions
212
of defendants.
Moreover, courts have held that infringement of a
patented method cannot be avoided by defendants that have another
213
party perform a step of the method.
C. An Attempt at Clarification Leads to Confusion
Only a few years after Muniauction, the Federal Circuit heard two
additional joint infringement cases. In Akamai I, the Federal Circuit
reasoned that the “direction or control” test must be read in the
214
context of traditional agency law and that “direction, no matter
215
The
how explicit,” is not an indicator of an agency relationship.
208. 1 U.S.C. § 1 (2006).
209. Amicus Brief for Neither Party, supra note 206, at *18 (“On its face, this
statutory prohibition is directed to ‘whoever’ has engaged in infringing conduct and
says nothing about whether such conduct is to be carried out by a single entity or a
group of entities acting in concert with one another.”). But see Akamai II, 692 F.3d at
1347–48 (Linn, J., dissenting) (arguing that the use of the word “whoever” in the
plural simply indicates that “[m]ore than one entity can be independently liable for
direct patent infringement”).
210. 77 F. 288 (6th Cir. 1896).
211. Id. at 297.
212. See, e.g., Mahurkar v. C.R. Bard Inc., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1125, 1129 (N.D.
Ill. 2003) (agreeing that the joint infringer theory is viable under § 271(a);
McDermott v. Omid Int’l, 723 F. Supp. 1228, 1236 (S.D. Ohio 1988) (holding that
the defendants are jointly liable when the infringement was the result of the
“participation and combined actions of the defendants”), aff’d per curiam sub nom.
McDermott v. Omid Int’l & Oriental Rug Supply House, Nos. 88-1592, 88-1593, 1989
WL 72920 (Fed. Cir. July 6, 1989).
213. Shields v. Halliburton Co., 493 F. Supp. 1376, 1389 (W.D. La. 1980), aff’d, 667
F.2d 1232 (5th Cir. 1982); see also Crowell v. Baker Oil Tools, Inc., 143 F.2d 1003,
1004 (9th Cir. 1944) (“It is obvious that one may infringe a patent if he employ an
agent for that purpose or have the offending articles manufactured for him by an
independent contractor.”); Metal Film Co. v. Metlon Corp., 316 F. Supp. 96, 110
n.12 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (“That defendants choose to have the vacuum metallizing,
which was a conventional step . . . done by outside suppliers does not mitigate their
infringement of the overall process.”).
214. Akamai I, 629 F.3d 1311, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2010), rev’d, 692 F.3d 1301.
215. Id. at 1321.
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Federal Circuit held in McKesson that the actions of one party could
not be attributed to the accused infringer in the absence of an agency
216
relationship or contractual obligation. However, a vigorous dissent
in McKesson by Judge Newman was followed by the Federal Circuit
granting a rehearing en banc in both cases. The rehearing resulted
in an opinion from a fractured Federal Circuit that did little to
resolve some of the key issues and set up a potential review by the
217
Supreme Court.
Akamai I
In June 2006, Akamai Technologies, Inc. and the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology (collectively, “Akamai”) sued Limelight
Networks, Inc. (Limelight) in the United States District Court for the
District of Massachusetts for allegedly infringing three patents
218
directed to Akamai’s content delivery network service. The district
court granted judgment as a matter of law (JMOL), overturning a
jury verdict of infringement by Limelight on claims 19-21 and 34 of
U.S. Patent No. 6,108,703 (the “‘703 patent”) and Akamai appealed
219
to the Federal Circuit.
The technology central to the dispute involved a Content Delivery
220
Network (“CDN”) made up of several computer systems.
Both
221
In
Akamai and Limelight offer CDN services to its customers.
addition, Akamai owns three patents disclosing a CDN system for
allowing a content provider to outsource the storage and delivery of
222
portions of its website content.
As described in the patents, the system delivers information over
the Internet by placing its components in optimal geographic
223
locations.
The prior art systems store several copies of an entire
224
website across different computers.
In contrast, Akamai’s content
225
delivery service replicates just the embedded objects of a website.
Akamai’s content delivery service separates the storage of these
1.

216. McKesson Techs. Inc. v. Epic Sys. Corp., 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1281, 1284
(Fed. Cir. 2011), rev’d sub nom. Akamai II, 692 F.3d 1301.
217. See Akamai II, 692 F.3d at 1305–07. A six judge majority issued a per curiam
opinion while five judges dissented. Even the dissenters were split four to one, which
resulted in Judge Newman separately writing another vigorous dissent.
218. Akamai I, 629 F.3d at 1316.
219. Id. at 1314.
220. Id. at 1315.
221. Id. at 1316.
222. Id. at 1315.
223. Id. at 1315–16.
224. Id.
225. Id.
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226

embedded objects for a single website over several devices.
A
content provider’s computer stores the base document while a CDN
227
In order for a
stores individual embedded objects of the website.
user to access the embedded objects, the URL of the embedded
228
object must point to a CDN.
Accordingly, the URL of the
embedded objects must be modified by a “tagging” process so that it
229
can be served by global hosting servers.
The Federal Circuit summarized Limelight’s implementation of its
CDN service as follows:
Limelight’s accused service delivers content providers’ embedded
objects from its CDN. According to Limelight’s contracts with its
content provider customers, to use Limelight’s CDN service, the
content provider must perform several steps. First, the content
provider must choose which embedded objects, if any, it would like
to be served from Limelight’s CDN. The content provider must
then tag the URL of each chosen object as instructed by Limelight.
Limelight then replicates the properly tagged objects on some or
all of its servers and directs a user’s request for one of these objects
230
to an appropriate Limelight server.

The two independent method claims asserted by Akamai at trial
require “tagging” at least some embedded objects in a content
provider’s web page such that requests for those objects resolve to a
231
domain name other than the content provider’s domain name.
Claims 19 and 34 are reproduced below with emphasis on the
“tagging” step:
19. A content delivery service, comprising:
replicating a set of page objects across a wide area network of
content servers managed by a domain other than a content
provider domain;
for a given page normally served from the content provider domain, tagging
the embedded objects of the page so that requests for the page objects
resolve to the domain instead of the content provider domain;
responsive to a request for the given page received at the content
provider domain, serving the given page from the content
provider domain; and

226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.

Id.
Id. at 1315.
Id. at 1316.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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serving at least one embedded object of the given page from a
given content server in the domain instead of from the content
232
provider domain.
34. A content delivery method, comprising:
distributing a set of page objects across a network of content servers
managed by a domain other than a content provider domain,
wherein the network of content servers are organized into a set
of regions;
for a given page normally served from the content provider domain, tagging
at least some of the embedded objects of the page so that requests for the
objects resolve to the domain instead of the content provider domain;
in response to a client request for an embedded object of the page:
resolving the client request as a function of a location of the
client machine making the request and current Internet traffic
conditions to identify a given region; and
returning to the client an IP address of a given one of the content
servers within the given region that is likely to host the
233
embedded object and that is not overloaded.

An important point, which was not in dispute by the parties, was
234
that Limelight did not perform every step of claims 19 or 34. That
235
is, Limelight did not perform the emphasized tagging steps.
Instead, Limelight provided the information necessary to its
customers (content providers) so that they could perform the tagging
236
steps themselves.
At trial, Akamai relied on a theory of joint liability and asserted that
Limelight directed or controlled its customers to perform the
237
“tagging” step in both method claims.
After a finding of
infringement, Limelight moved for a JMOL that it did not infringe
238
Relying on the decision in
the asserted method claims.
Muniauction, the district court granted the JMOL on the grounds that
there was “no material difference between Limelight’s interaction
239
with its customers and that of Thompson [sic] in Muniauction.” On
appeal, Akamai argued that the evidence presented at trial supported

232. U.S. Patent No. 6,108,703 col. 19 ll. 6–20 (filed May 19, 1999) (emphasis
added).
233. Id. col. 20 ll. 32–52 (emphasis added).
234. Akamai I, 629 F.3d at 1317.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id. at 1318.
239. Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 614 F. Supp. 2d 90, 122–23
(D. Mass. 2009), aff’d, 629 F.3d 1311, rev’d en banc, per curiam, 692 F.3d 1301 (Fed.
Cir. 2012).
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a jury determination that Limelight exercises control or direction
240
over the claimed methods.
The Federal Circuit summarized Akamai’s arguments as follows:
Limelight: (1) creates and assigns a unique hostname for the
content provider; (2) provides explicit step-by-step instructions to
perform the tagging and serving claim steps; (3) offers technical
assistance to help content providers with their performance of the
claim steps; and (4) contractually requires content providers to
perform the tagging and serving claim steps if they utilize the
241
Limelight service.

In response, Limelight argued that these facts were
“indistinguishable” from those found in Muniauction and that the
242
JMOL should be affirmed.
In Akamai I, the Federal Circuit began its analysis by summarizing
243
its findings in BMC and Muniauction. The court stated that “direct
infringement requires a single party to perform every step of a
244
claimed method.”
If more than one party is required to perform
the claimed method, there is “no infringement unless ‘one party
exercises “control or direction” over the entire process such that
245
every step is attributable to the controlling party.’”
The Federal
Circuit explained that its holding in Muniauction clarified that “the
requisite level of control or direction over the acts committed by a
third party is met in circumstances in which ‘the law would
traditionally hold the accused direct infringer vicariously liable for
246
the acts committed by another party.’”
Here, the Federal Circuit went on to explain that it is essential to
determine whether the acts of one party may be attributed to the
247
other. The court clarified that “the performance of a method step
may be attributed to an accused infringer when the relationship
between the accused infringer and another party performing a
method step is that of principal and agent,” or “that joint
infringement occurs when a party is contractually obligated to the

240. Akamai I, 629 F.3d at 1318.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id. at 1318–19.
244. Id. at 1318 (citing BMC Res., Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P., 498 F.3d 1373, 1378–
79 (Fed. Cir. 2007), overruled by Akamai II, 692 F.3d 1301).
245. Id. at 1318–19 (quoting Muniauction, Inc v. Thomson Corp., 532 F.3d 1318,
1329 (Fed. Cir. 2008), overruled by Akamai II, 692 F.3d 1301).
246. Id. at 1319 (quoting Muniauction, 532 F.3d at 1330) (explaining that in
Muniauction, the instructions given by the defendant to its product users were not
sufficient to meet the “control or direction” test).
247. Id.
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248

accused infringer to perform a method step.”
Accordingly, the
Federal Circuit held that there could only be joint infringement in
two cases: (1) “when there is an agency relationship between the
parties who perform the method steps,” or (2) “when one party is
249
contractually obligated to the other to perform the steps.”
Analyzing the facts, the Federal Circuit stated that there were neither
facts that indicated Limelight’s customers performed the steps of the
claimed method as Limelight’s agents nor a contractual obligation to
250
perform the method steps.
In response to Akamai’s argument that the word “direct” in the
“direction or control” test must mean something other than
“control,” the court stated that the “direction or control” test “must
251
be read in the context of traditional agency law.”
Based on that
pronouncement, the court then stated that “there is no indication
that an agency relationship arises when one party simply provides
252
direction, no matter how explicit, to another party.”
The court also decided that the facts were insufficient to find that
253
Limelight’s customers were contractually obligated to Limelight.
Limelight’s form contract with its customers does not obligate them
to perform any of the method steps; instead it simply explains what
254
the customers must do to take advantage of Limelight’s services.
Accordingly, because Limelight did not perform the “tag” step of the
asserted method claims and the record contained no evidence that
Limelight controlled its customers’ “tagging” the content, the
255
Federal Circuit affirmed the finding of non-infringement.
On April 20, 2011, the Federal Circuit decided that Akamai I
256
warranted en banc reconsideration. Both parties were requested to
file briefs addressing the following issue: “If separate entities each
perform separate steps of a method claim, under what circumstances
would that claim be directly infringed and to what extent would each
257
of the parties be liable?” The Federal Circuit would follow a similar
path in McKesson.

248. Id.
249. Id. at 1320.
250. See id. at 1320–21 (holding that Limelight’s control over customers was
similar to the relationship in Muniauction and that therefore there was no agency).
251. Id. at 1320.
252. Id. at 1321.
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Id. at 1314, 1322.
256. Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 419 F. App’x 989, 989 (Fed.
Cir. 2011).
257. Id.
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McKesson
258
The technology at issue in McKesson was also Internet-based.
Specifically, the patent-in-suit, U.S. Patent No. 6,757,898 or “the ‘898
patent,” relates to a method for a patient and healthcare provider to
259
share information with each other via the Internet.
Epic Systems Corporation (Epic), a software development
260
company, licensed its “MyChart” software to healthcare providers.
In turn, healthcare providers provided MyChart software to their
261
patients as an option.
The MyChart software allows healthcare
262
In
providers to associate medical records with a patient webpage.
addition, patients can use MyChart to communicate with healthcare
263
providers online.
In order for a patient to use the MyChart
software, the patient must “initiate a communication” to the
264
provider, i.e., log on to a healthcare provider’s MyChart page.
McKesson, the owner of the ‘898 patent, sued Epic in the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia, alleging
that Epic induced infringement of the ‘898 patent by licensing its
265
MyChart software to healthcare providers.
Claim 1 of the ‘898 patent is representative of the claims asserted
against Epic. The initiating step, performed by the patient is
highlighted below:
2.

1. A method of automatically and electronically communicating
between at least one health-care provider and a plurality of users
serviced by the health-care provider, said method comprising the
steps of:
initiating a communication by one of the plurality of users to the provider
for information, wherein the provider has established a preexisting
medical record for each user;
enabling communication by transporting the communication
through a provider/patient interface. . .;
electronically comparing content of the communication . . .;
258. McKesson Info. Solutions LLC v. Epic Sys. Corp., No. 1:06-CV-2965-JTC, 2009
WL 2915778, at *1–2 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 6, 2009), aff’d sub nom. McKesson Techs. Inc. v.
Epic Sys. Corp. 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2011), rev’d en banc, per curiam
sub nom. Akamai II, 692 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
259. Id. at *1.
260. McKesson, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1282.
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. McKesson Info. Solutions LLC v. Epic Sys. Corp., No. 1:06-CV-2965-JTC, 2009
WL 2915778, at *1–2 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 6, 2009), aff’d sub nom. McKesson Techs. Inc. v.
Epic Sys. Corp. 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1281, rev’d en banc, per curiam sub nom. Akamai
II, 692 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
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returning the response to the communication automatically . . .;
said provider/patient interface providing a fully automated
mechanism for generating a personalized page or area within
the provider’s Web site for each user serviced by the provider;
and
said patient-provider interface service center for dynamically
266
assembling and delivering customer content to said user.

Similar to Akamai I, the parties did not dispute that Epic’s MyChart
267
software did not perform each step of the method. Accordingly, on
the issue of joint infringement, Epic argued in a motion for summary
judgment and a renewed motion for summary judgment that Epic’s
customer’s (the healthcare providers) neither performed the
“initiating a communication” step nor exercised “direction or
268
control” over the party that performs the “initiating” step.
The
district court agreed with Epic and granted its renewed motion for
269
summary judgment.
270
McKesson appealed the decision to the Federal Circuit.
On
appeal, the court noted that McKesson alleged induced
infringement, which, according to the court at that time required a
271
showing that a single entity committed the act of infringement.
The Federal Circuit framed the issue as “whether the relationship
between Epic’s customers (MyChart providers) and the MyChart
users is such that performance of the ‘initiating a communication’
272
step may be attributed to the MyChart providers.”
The court summarized its previous decisions in BMC and
273
Muniauction and further elaborated on its decision in Akamai I.
Accordingly, McKesson summarizes the Federal Circuit’s previous
holdings concerning joint infringement as follows: (1) “where the
actions of multiple parties combine to perform every step of a
claimed method, the claim is directly infringed only if one party
exercises ‘control or direction’ over the entire process such that every
274
step is attributable to the controlling party,” (2) “[t]he ‘control or
266. U.S. Patent No. 6,757,898 col. 44 l. 60–col. 45 l. 24 (filed Jan. 18, 2000)
(emphasis added).
267. McKesson, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1282.
268. Id. at 1283.
269. Id.
270. Id.
271. Id.; see discussion supra Part I.B.4
272. McKesson, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1283.
273. Id. at 1283–84.
274. Id. at 1283 (quoting Muniauction, Inc. v. Thomson Corp., 532 F.3d 1318,
1329 (Fed. Cir. 2008), overruled by Akamai II, 692 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (en
banc) (per curiam).
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direction’ standard is satisfied in situations where the law would
traditionally hold the accused direct infringer vicariously liable for
the acts committed by another party that are required to complete
275
performance of a claimed method,” and (3) “there can only be
joint infringement when there is an agency relationship between the
parties who perform the method steps or when one party is
276
contractually obligated to the other to perform the steps.”
The parties and the court focused their arguments on the
relationship between the doctors and patients using the MyChart
277
software. McKesson essentially argued that a relationship less than
agency would satisfy the “direction or control” test by arguing that a
doctor–patient relationship was sufficient for a finding of
278
attribution.
In response, applying the test under Akamai I, the
Federal Circuit found that a doctor-patient relationship was not an
279
The court
agency relationship or a contractual obligation.
concluded that the actions of MyChart users could not be attributed
to Epic’s customers (the healthcare providers) without an agency
relationship or contractual obligation, and thus, McKesson failed to
280
demonstrate that a single party directly infringed the ‘898 patent.
In response to McKesson’s arguments, the court repeated its
statement in BMC that “expanding the rules governing direct
infringement to reach independent conduct of multiple actors would
281
subvert the statutory scheme for indirect infringement.” The court
elaborated that the “single harm” of direct patent infringement was
limited to those who practiced each and every element of the
invention and that absent direct infringement, the patentee has not
282
suffered compensable harm.
275. Id. at 1283 (quoting Muniauction, 532 F.3d at 1330).
276. Id. at 1283–84 (quoting Akamai I, 629 F.3d 1311, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2010), rev’d,
692 F.3d 1301).
277. See id. at 1284 (discussing whether a doctor-patient relationship alone gives
rise to either an agency relationship between the parties or a contractual obligation
on the patients).
278. See id. (explaining that McKesson argued that the doctor-patient relationship
is more than a mere arms-length relationship, and instead is more analogous to an
agency relationship because “[t]he phrase ‘doctor’s orders’ says it all” and because
of “doctor-patient privilege”).
279. See id. (opining that MyChart users only acted for their own benefit and were
not under the MyChart providers’ control).
280. Id.
281. Id. (quoting BMC Res., Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P., 498 F.3d 1373, 1381 (Fed.
Cir. 2007), overruled by Akamai II, 692 F.3d 1301).
282. Id. at 1285; cf. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S.
913, 930 (2005) (stating “[o]ne infringes contributorily by intentionally inducing or
encouraging direct infringement, and infringes vicariously by profiting from direct
infringement while declining to exercise a right to stop or limit it” (citation
omitted)).
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Judge Bryson concurred with the decision based on the precedents
283
set forth in BMC and Akamai I but suggested en banc review.
Conversely, Judge Newman issued a vigorous dissent and framed the
decision as an attack on all interactive methods and their underlying
284
technologies.
Soon thereafter, the Federal Circuit decided that
285
McKesson warranted an en banc rehearing.
McKesson dissent and questions posed by the Federal Circuit
Judge Newman’s dissent in McKesson highlights two issues with the
majority opinion. First, Judge Newman asserts that the decision in
286
McKesson does not follow earlier panel precedent.
Judge Newman
categorizes the rulings in several previous joint infringement cases as
inconsistent, stating that “[p]anels of this court distinguishing
between practice of an element of a system, and practice of an
element of a method, does not add clarity or predictability to patent
287
Further, Judge Newman notes that previous panels of the
law.”
Federal Circuit and the Supreme Court have held that there can be
infringement liability when steps of a claimed method are performed
288
by different entities.
With respect to the agency or contractual
obligation test set forth in Akamai I, Judge Newman asserts that there
289
is no such rule of law.
Judge Newman argues that by upholding the notion that “neither
collaboration nor joint action nor facilitation nor authorization nor
invitation can overcome the immutable barrier to infringement when
all of the participating entities are not under the ‘control or
direction’ of a mastermind infringer,” the court eliminates the patent
incentive for interactive procedures and “disserves commerce,
290
fairness, and the innovation incentive.”
Thus, Judge Newman
3.

283. McKesson, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1285 (Bryson, J., concurring).
284. See id. at 1291 (Newman, J., dissenting) (affirming that this case was not an
effort to broaden the scope of patent rights, and claiming that the majority’s decision
removes all interactive methods from patent eligibility).
285. See McKesson Techs. Inc. v. Epic Sys. Corp., 463 F. App’x 906 (Fed. Cir. 2011)
(per curiam) (granting McKesson’s petition for rehearing en banc).
286. See McKesson, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1288–89 (Newman, J., dissenting)
(questioning the Federal Circuit’s interpretation of precedent, which resulted in the
“single-entity rule” of infringement being held as an absolute rule of law).
287. Id. at 1290.
288. Id. at 1286.
289. See id. at 1290 (describing the Akamai rule as a version of “aberrant
holdings”).
290. See id. at 1285–86 (stating that the decision, therefore, leaves interactive
methods more susceptible to infringement).
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concludes that a patent that cannot be infringed does not provide the
291
patentee with a right to exclude and therefore is not a patent at all.
Akamai II
The Federal Circuit issued its opinion in Akamai II on August 31,
2012. The opinion failed to answer many of the questions the
Federal Circuit asked the parties to brief. In issuing its opinion, the
majority acknowledged that doctrinal problems arise “when the acts
necessary to give rise to liability for direct infringement are shared
292
between two or more actors.” However, the majority passed on the
opportunity to clarify the law of joint infringement as it applied to
293
liability for direct infringement under § 271(a). Instead, the court
overruled its decisions in BMC and Muniauction and established a new
test under inducement for when more than one party performs steps
294
in a method claim.
Judges in the minority issued two dissenting
opinions. In one dissent, Judge Newman, writing for herself, argued
that there should be liability for infringement whenever one or more
295
parties perform the steps of a claimed method.
In the second
dissent, Judge Linn, joined by three other judges, argued for the
preservation of the direction or control test and asserted that the test
296
provides for a finding of liability where there is a joint enterprise.
The majority held that there can be liability for induced
infringement where all the steps are not performed by a single
297
entity. Because inducement does not require the induced party to
be an agent of the inducer or under the direction or control of the
inducer, the effect of the majority’s opinion is to eliminate the
“control or direction” test established and elaborated upon in BMC
and Muniauction. Relying on the House Report on the 1952 Act, the
majority reasoned that inducement applies to joint infringement
cases because one who aids or abets infringement is “likewise an
298
infringer.” In support of its inducement only rule, the majority also
explained that an inducer has the same impact on the patentee
299
whether he induces one party or multiple parties to infringe.
In contrast, Judge Linn’s dissent argued that inducement of a
4.

291. See id. at 1291 (“A patent that cannot be enforced on any theory of
infringement, is not a statutory patent right.”).
292. Akamai II, 692 F.3d 1301, 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (en banc) (per curiam).
293. Id. at 1305–06.
294. Id. at 1306.
295. Id. at 1336 (Newman, J., dissenting).
296. Id. at 1350 (Linn, J., dissenting).
297. Id. at 1306 (majority opinion).
298. Id. at 1309 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 82-1923, at 9 (1952)).
299. Id. at 1308–09.
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partial act that is not itself infringement is not inducement of any
300
Instead, the dissent relied on
prohibited conduct under the act.
the Supreme Court’s statement in Aro Manufacturing Co. v. Convertible
301
Top Replacement Co. that, “it is settled that if there is no direct
infringement of a patent there can be no contributory infringement”
302
Thus, in addition to
to reject the majority’s new position.
upholding the “control or direction” test, the dissent would have also
expanded it to hold:
“[D]irect infringement is required to support infringement under
§ 271(b) or § 271(c) and properly exists only where one party
performs each and every claim limitation or is vicariously liable for
the acts of others in completing any steps of a method claim, such
as when one party directs or controls another in a principal-agent
relationship or like contractual relationship, or participates in a joint
303
enterprise to practice each and every limitation of the claim.”

The dissent explained that a joint enterprise exists when there is:
(1) an agreement, express or implied, among the members of the
group; (2) a common purpose to be carried out by the group; (3) a
community of pecuniary interest in that purpose, among the
members; and (4) an equal right to a voice in the direction of the
enterprise, which gives an equal right of control.” 304

The dissent’s expansion of the “control or direction” test to
include a joint enterprise leads to a curious result. Based on this
approach, the dissent claims that the decision in Golden Hour, where
two parties each performed separate steps of a claimed method for
305
their mutual benefit, should be overturned.
However, the dissent
would affirm both decisions in Akamai I and McKesson because even
under its new joint enterprise theory, the customer in both cases
would not be considered to be in a joint enterprise with the service or
306
Finally, the dissent also reiterated arguments
product provider.
from BMC and other commentators that proper claim drafting can

300. Id. at 1346–47 (Linn, J., dissenting).
301. 365 U.S. 336, 341 (1961).
302. Akamai II, 692 F.3d at 1340 (Linn, J., dissenting) (quoting Aro, 365 U.S. at
341).
303. Id. at 1350 (emphasis added).
304. Id. at 1349 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 491 cmt. c. (1965)).
305. Id.; see Golden Hour Data Sys., Inc. v. emsCharts, Inc., 614 F.3d 1367, 1382
(Fed. Cir. 2010) (Newman, J., dissenting) (reiterating that, at trial, the jury found
that two companies, emsCharts and Softech enabled their respective programs to
work together such that their combined system, which they sold as a package, met all
the limitations of several of the asserted claims).
306. Akamai II, 692 F.3d at 1350–51 (Linn, J., dissenting).
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usually be used to avoid the issue of joint infringement and capture
307
infringement by a single party.
In her dissent, Judge Newman argued that the majority’s new rule
creates new problems for enforcement and compensation as well as
308
“new opportunities for gamesmanship and abuse and inequity.”
For example, Judge Newman argued that the court shifted the sole
focus to that of the alleged inducer who would be solely liable if all
309
the elements of inducement were proven.
Finally, instead of
inducement-only or the “control or direction” test, Judge Newman
argued that infringement occurs when all of the claimed steps are
performed without regard to how many parties are involved or their
310
relationship.
In sum, both dissents harshly criticize the majority for making new
311
policy and being a product of spontaneous judicial creation.
Further, instead of addressing the issue of joint liability for direct
infringement, the court replaced one narrow test with another that
312
could create opportunities for gamesmanship and abuse.
II. RATIONALE FOR A MORE FLEXIBLE APPROACH
A. Overview
The newly minted inducement-only rule and the dissents’
proposed tests for joint infringement are unsatisfactory for a number
of reasons. The Patent Act of 1952 codified the case law concerning
313
indirect infringement. However, most of the technology that is the
314
subject of current joint infringement cases did not exist in 1952.
Accordingly, the statute does not reflect (1) an understanding of
issues that might arise with new technologies and (2) the ways in

307. Id. at 1349.
308. Id. at 1320 (Newman, J., dissenting).
309. Id. at 1320.
310. Id. at 1323 (“Infringement is not a question of how many people it takes to
perform a patented method.”).
311. Id. at 1320; id. at 1337 (Linn, J., dissenting).
312. Id. at 1320 (Newman, J., dissenting).
313. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(b)–(c) (2006); see also supra notes 55–56 and
accompanying text.
314. The World Wide Web and the Internet were first proposed by Tim BernersLee in 1989. See TIM BERNERS-LEE, CERN, INFORMATION MANAGEMENT: A PROPOSAL
(1989), available at http://www.w3.org/History/1989/proposal.html (introducing
the concept of “linked information systems”).
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which multiple entities working in concert could infringe patents to
315
these new technologies.
Further, the Federal Circuit has acknowledged that a rule based
solely on the relationship between relevant actors creates a legal
316
loophole.
This loophole is a roadmap for perceptive entities,
allowing them to reap the benefit of a patent that cannot be
317
enforced.
In her dissent in McKesson, Judge Newman stated, “[a]
patent that cannot be enforced on any theory of infringement, is not
318
Further, Judge Newman seems to fear
a statutory patent right.”
that rendering valid interactive method claims unenforceable will
discourage “information-age” companies from seeking patent
319
protection and as a result, stifle innovation.
This outcome is
directly in conflict with the constitutional mandate that Congress
320
“promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.”
However,
Judge Newman’s proposal that direct infringement occurs when all
the claimed steps are performed without regard to any circumstances
surrounding the alleged infringement would ensnare innocent actors
and once caught would place an undue burden on the courts to cut
321
them free.
Accordingly, a more flexible approach must be implemented in
order to produce consistent and fair legal results. In the wake of
Akamai II, the Federal Circuit eliminated the “direction or control”
322
test and established an inducement-only rule. Nevertheless, the law
should carefully expand the test for joint infringement beyond

315. See discussion supra Part I (describing how courts have struggled to find
consensus for the novel problems presented by new technologies involving multiple
actors).
316. See infra Part II.C.1 (suggesting that parties could enter into arms-length
agreements to avoid infringement under the control or direction standard).
317. See BMC Res., Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P., 498 F.3d 1373, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2007)
(downplaying concerns over infringement-avoidance by stating that “arms-length
cooperation can usually be offset by proper claim drafting”), overruled by Akamai II,
692 F.3d 1301.
318. McKesson Techs. Inc. v. Epic Sys. Corp., 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1281, 1291
(Fed. Cir. 2011) (Newman, J., dissenting), rev’d sub nom. Akamai II, 692 F.3d 1301.
319. See id. at 1286 (arguing that the court’s decision “eliminates the patent
incentive from such interactive procedures,” leaving these types of methods
vulnerable to infringement and enlarges inconsistent precedent that could deter
innovation).
320. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
321. See Akamai II, 692 F.3d at 1350 (Linn, J., dissenting) (describing Judge
Newman’s approach as permitting “joint actor infringement liability whenever
independent parties collectively infringe a patent”).
322. See id. at 1306 (concluding that direction or control test interpretation of
section 271(b) “is wrong as a matter of statutory construction, precedent, and sound
patent policy”).
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focusing solely on inducement or the relationship between relevant
actors.
There are several reasons to create a flexible approach to joint
infringement. Congress could not take into account existing
interactive technology when it drafted the current statutory
323
provisions concerning contributory and indirect infringement.
Second, absent a showing of inducement, the current Federal Circuit
324
test creates a loophole in the law. In addition, the Supreme Court
has recently rejected tests established by the Federal Circuit for
325
various reasons.
Furthermore, laws that allow for broader
enforcement of interactive method claims would place U.S. law on
326
Finally, as the
par with the laws in other prominent countries.
world becomes increasingly interconnected, a more flexible
enforcement mechanism may encourage further innovation.
B. The Limitations of § 271
Section 271 does not equip the judiciary to properly handle the
joint infringement fact patterns of the Information Age. The Patent
Act of 1952 codified the pre-1952 common law concerning indirect
327
infringement.
The case law recognized that an action for
infringement should lie when more than one party contributed to
328
the infringement of a patent claim. However, the common law was
329
developed from cases concerning industrial age technologies.
Thus, the interactive methods and the capability to carry out

323. The Patent Act of 1952, which codified rules on indirect infringement, was
drafted prior to the creation of the Internet and its associated technologies. See
BERNERS-LEE, supra note 314 (introducing the concept of the Internet in 1989). But
see Akamai II, 692 F.3d at 1343 (Linn, J., dissenting) (arguing that Congress recently
had the opportunity to modify the statute but chose not to do so).
324. See infra Part II.C.1 (suggesting that parties could enter into arms-length
agreements to avoid infringement under the control or direction standard); see also
BMC Res., Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P., 498 F.3d 1373, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2007)
(acknowledging that the current law creates a loophole but asserting that the law
imposes vicarious liability on any party that can be shown to have controlled the
actions of the infringing actor), overruled by Akamai II, 692 F.3d 1301.
325. See infra Part II.C.2 (discussing the Supreme Court’s rejection of Federal
Circuit tests).
326. See discussion infra Part II.E.
327. See H.R. REP. NO. 82-1923, at 9 (1952) (explaining that the purpose of § 271
in the Patent Act of 1952 was to codify principles of contributory infringement and
clarify its scope).
328. See Wallace v. Holmes, 29 F. Cas. 74, 80 (C.C.D. Conn. 1871) (No. 17,100)
(finding that the defendant was guilty of copyright infringement despite the fact that
the defendant used only part of a patented system because the defendant knew third
parties would provide the patented system’s additional parts and the defendant,
therefore, was a joint infringer of the complainant’s patent).
329. See, e.g., id. at 75 (depicting the patent at issue in the case as an oil lamp).
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interactive processes that are the subject of recent joint infringement
330
cases did not exist before 1952.
The language of the statute is additionally limited by its narrow
interpretation, as reflected in the Federal Circuit’s “single entity”
331
rule.
According to the “single entity” rule, “whoever” in § 271
332
In contrast, one commentator has
refers to only a single entity.
stated that the focus of direct infringement should be upon a single
333
act, not a single actor. That is, the court should determine whether
one single act of infringement has occurred when the acts of
334
individuals are considered as a whole. At this stage, the single entity
rule remains intact with respect to infringement under § 271(a),
335
although there seems to be sufficient rationale to eliminate it.
Legislative clarification would be the simplest and most desirable
solution.
Unfortunately, Congress missed an excellent opportunity to clarify
336
the law. Specifically, the America Invents Act did nothing to resolve
337
However, Congress did
the issues raised in Akamai I or McKesson.
pass some provisions that indicate that it is well aware of the overall
controversy surrounding method claims; for example, the
330. See BERNERS-LEE, supra note 314 (suggesting the idea for the World Wide Web
and writing its code in 1989). But see Akamai II, 692 F.3d 1301, 1310–11 (Fed. Cir.
2012) (en banc) (per curiam) (explaining that Judge Giles J. Rich foreshadowed
enforcement problems with method claims involving a radio transmitter and
receiver).
331. McKesson Techs. Inc. v. Epic Sys. Corp., 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1281, 1282
(Fed. Cir. 2011) (affirming the finding of “noninfringement” based on the
complainant’s failure to attribute the infringement to a single party), rev’d sub nom.
Akamai II, 692 F.3d 1301.
332. See Larsen, supra note 191, at 50–51 (explaining that the court in BMC
applied the “Single Actor” rule and refused to aggregate the actions of various
actors).
333. See Naoki Mizutani, SOFTIC Special Researcher , Remarks at Panel on Patent
Infringement Suits in Global Network Age, SOFTIC Symposium 2001: Information
Distribution and Legal Protection in Cyberspace—In Search of a New System 83
(Nov. 21, 2001), available at http://www.softic.or.jp/symposium/records/SOFTIC_
10%82%94h_proceedings.pdf (arguing that patent infringement can exist even
when a plurality of persons is involved).
334. See id. (recommending that attorneys avoid the single entity rule by framing
infringement claims in terms of a single infringer).
335. See discussion supra Part I.B.4.
336. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011)
(to be codified in scattered sections of 28 and 35 U.S.C.).
337. See Akamai II, 692 F.3d 1301, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (en banc) (per curiam)
(Linn, J., dissenting) (asserting that if Congress took issue with the court’s
interpretation of § 271(a), (b) and (c) in BMC and Muniauction, it would have
amended the statute in the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act). The Leahy-Smith
America Invents Act provided major reforms to the U.S. patent system, switching the
system from a “first to invent” to a “first inventor to file” and implementing myriad
additional changes. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act § 3(o)–(p). The Act,
however, does not address the issue of joint infringement.
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“Transitional Program for Covered Business Method Patents”
provides for a special procedure in which an accused infringer can
challenge the validity of a business method patent covering a process
338
related to a financial product or service. While this provision could
increase the difficulty in obtaining a patent on business methods, it
does not foreclose interactive method patents nor does it advocate
for a system in which patents granted to interactive method
339
inventions can only be enforced in an inducement context.
C. The Limitations of the Judiciary
1.

A judicially created loophole
There is no clear example of facts that would pass muster under
the majority’s inducement-only test. At the district court level, only a
handful of cases in which joint infringement was asserted survived
summary judgment. For example, in Movielink, evidence that an
alleged infringer exercised continuing control in a distributed system
was sufficient to support a claim for infringement under the direction
340
In another example, the court in Emtel, Inc. v.
or control test.
LipidLabs, Inc. stated that evidence of an alleged infringer causing
third parties to perform in accordance with specific instructions and
requirements was sufficient to support a claim for joint
341
infringement. Unfortunately, the Federal Circuit has not reviewed
the aforementioned cases. Further, the Federal Circuit remanded
both Akamai II and McKesson for further proceedings on the theory of
342
induced infringement.
In BMC and subsequent Federal Circuit cases, the court
343
acknowledged that a loophole in the law exists. This loophole now
338. Id. § 18.
339. See generally Corrected Brief of Amici Curiae Aristocrat Technologies Australia
Pty Ltd. & Aristocrat Technologies, Inc. in Support of Appellants Akamai
Technologies, Inc. & the Massachusetts Institute of Technology & Supporting
Reversal, Akamai II, 692 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (en banc) (per curiam) (Nos.
2009-1372, -1380, -1417), 2011 WL 3101891 [hereinafter Corrected Brief of Amici
Curiae].
340. See id. at 236 (finding that summary judgment was not warranted because the
complainant was able to provide sufficient evidence to support its assertion that the
respondent retains sufficient control over software running on customers’ computers
so as to still be held liable as a direct infringer).
341. See Emtel, Inc. v. Lipidlabs, Inc., 583 F. Supp. 2d 811, 839–40 (S.D. Tex.
2008) (granting defendant’s motion for summary judgment because the relationship
between the defendant and third party was too tenuous and did not rise to the level
where the defendant could be held vicariously liable for the third party’s
performance).
342. Akamai II, 692 F.3d at 1319.
343. BMC Res., Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P., 498 F.3d 1373, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2007)
(acknowledging the existence of the loophole but asserting that related concerns are
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allows two or more parties to infringe method patents absent a
344
showing that one party induced the other to infringe.
Unfortunately, no patentee has had the opportunity to present
evidence to successfully satisfy the Federal Circuit’s new inducementonly test. While this is by no means proof of an incorrect test, it is
nevertheless an important data point especially in view of recent
Supreme Court decisions that have struck down Federal Circuit
345
tests.
2.

Supreme Court rejection of Federal Circuit tests
The Supreme Court has suggested that several of the tests
346
For example,
developed by the Federal Circuit are too restrictive.
347
in KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc., the Supreme Court found
that the Federal Circuit’s “teaching, suggestion or motivation” test
(“TSM”) was not supported by its precedent interpreting 35 U.S.C.
348
§ 103, the statute governing obviousness. In striking down the TSM
349
test, the Supreme Court interpreted the statutory language broadly.
350
Similarly, in Bilski v. Kappos, the Supreme Court indicated that
the Federal Circuit’s “machine or transformation” test for patentable
subject matter was useful but not dispositive as to whether an
351
invention was patentable. Instead of relying solely on the machine
or transformation test to determine patent eligibility, the Court
referred to its earlier precedent that interpreted the patent eligibility
352
statute more broadly. Accordingly, the Supreme Court made clear

less problematic than the concerns that could arise if the rules for direct
infringement were broadened), overruled by Akamai II, 692 F.3d 1301.
344. Id. (stating that only a defendant who served as a “mastermind” and either
controlled or directed another entity would warrant a finding of joint infringement).
345. See infra Part II.C.2 (discussing the Supreme Court’s rejection of Federal
Circuit tests).
346. See Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3226–27 (2010); KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex
Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 415 (2007).
347. 550 U.S. 398 (2007).
348. Id. at 419 (declaring that the Federal Circuit’s TSM test is inconsistent with
prior Supreme Court cases because it is overly rigid).
349. See id. at 415 (“We begin by rejecting the rigid approach of the Court of
Appeals. Throughout this Court’s engagement with the question of obviousness, our
cases have set forth an expansive and flexible approach inconsistent with the way the
Court of Appeals applied its TSM test here.”).
350. 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010).
351. See id. at 3226–27 (declaring that the Court of Appeals incorrectly concluded
that the Supreme Court had endorsed the machine-or-transformation test as an
exclusive or exhaustive test).
352. See id. (recognizing precedent that held that process patents could qualify if
they did not meet machine or transformation requirements for patentability (citing
Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 588 n.9 (1978))); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 70
(1972).
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in Bilski that method claims directed to “information age”
353
innovations were eligible for patent protection.
Thus, over the last several years a trend has developed where the
Supreme Court strikes down rigid rules established by the Federal
354
Circuit in favor of more open ended and flexible standards.
One
article has observed that the Supreme Court prefers open-ended
judicial inquiries that closely adhere to the language and purpose of
355
the statute.
Further, the Supreme Court has said that when
technological change has rendered the literal terms of an act
ambiguous, the act should be construed in light of its basic
356
purposes. Given that the language of the statue is not as helpful in
the case of interactive methods, further consideration should be
given to policy arguments in favor of enforcement of interactive
357
method claims.
D. Claim Drafting
In acknowledgement of the statutory language and judicial
loophole, the Federal Circuit and several commentators have said
that patentees can avoid joint infringement issues by drafting claims
358
directed to a single infringer.
Moreover, the Federal Circuit has
359
said that it will not rewrite or correct poorly drafted claims.
However, drafting so-called better claims directed to a single
infringer is not a cure-all. Some patents are by their nature
353. Id. at 3227 (suggesting the machine or transformation test may be
inappropriate in the Information Age because it would call into question the
patentability of myriad high-tech products).
354. See Gregory A. Castanias et al., 2010 Patent Law Decisions of the Federal Circuit:
The Advent of “The Rader Court,” 60 AM. U. L. REV. 845, 857 (2011) (describing various
examples of the dichotomy between the Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit in
the patent context).
355. See id. at 856–57 (describing these principles as lessons that can be learned
from the Supreme Court’s decision in Bilski).
356. See Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975)
(providing that the Copyright Act must be interpreted so as to retain its fundamental
purpose when technological changes have “rendered its literal terms ambiguous”).
357. See Bilski 130 S. Ct. at 3227 (describing the problems of applying § 101’s
patent eligibility principles to modern technology in the advent of the Information
Age).
358. See BMC Res., Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P., 498 F.3d 1373, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2007)
(stating that “[a] patentee can usually structure a claim to capture infringement by a
single party”), overruled by Akamai II, 692 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (en banc) (per
curiam); see also Lemley et al., supra note 33, at 272 (“Most inventions that involve
cooperation of multiple entities can be covered using claims drafted in unitary form
simply by focusing on one entity and whether it supplies or receives any given
element.”).
359. See BMC, 498 F.3d at 1381 (explaining that the plaintiff could have drafted its
claims so as to focus on only one entity, but that the court will not change the claim
so as to remedy the error).
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interactive, and in order to properly claim the invention, the claims
360
The
must be directed to or mention more than a single actor.
effect of a rigid rule that relies on the existence of inducement is that
it renders many patents directed to interactive technologies
361
unenforceable.
A more desirable standard for determining joint
infringement liability would prevent interactive patents from being
completely unenforceable and simultaneously support the Federal
Circuit’s position for placing the burden on the applicant to draft
clearer claims.
E. International Approaches
A more flexible joint infringement standard would put the United
States on par with other countries. Interactive method patents in
some prominent countries enjoy a lower hurdle to enforcement than
362
their U.S. counterparts.
This lower standard allows patentees in
these countries to recover against an entity that commercially benefits
363
from the invention without performing each step.
Given the
growing importance of international patents to the top American
364
innovators, it is instructive to examine how other countries have
addressed the problem of joint infringement.
Under a “partial infringement” theory, several European countries
subject an entity to liability when that entity has practiced the
365
substance of the invention.
That is, even if the accused infringer
366
omitted a nominal step, it may be liable for infringement.

360. See Lee, supra note 39, at 349 (explaining that patentability of Internet
patents may lie in the combination of various steps).
361. See, e.g., BMC, 498 F.3d at 1381 (refusing to find infringement because there
was no evidence of direct control). Armed only with unenforceable patents,
patentees cannot prevent others from making, using, or selling their invention. If
patentees’ ability to prevent others from exploiting the patentees’ technology is
extinguished, it is reasonable that certain business sectors may stop filing
applications.
362. See Jochen Pagenberg, The Scope of Art. 69 European Patent Convention: Should
Sub-Combinations Be Protected?—A Comparative Analysis on the Basis of French and German
Law, 24 INT’L REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 314, 315–16 (1993) (requiring
infringement of the core of the invention, but not necessarily every step).
363. See Larsen, supra note 191, at 59–60 (construing partial infringement as
allowing recovery for claims that would be otherwise barred in the United States).
364. See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, INTERNATIONAL PATENT PROTECTIONS
FOR SMALL BUSINESSES 4 (2012), available at http://www.uspto.gov/aia_
implementation/20120113-ippr_report.pdf (claiming that innovators in the
American economy need patent protection, especially when deciding upon crossborder transactions).
365. See Convention for the European Patent for the Common Market, Dec. 30,
1989, O.J. L 401, art. 26; see also 5 R. CARL MOY, MOY’S WALKER ON PATENTS § 15:14, at
15-83 to -84 (4th ed. 2011).
366. See MOY, supra note 365, § 15:14, at 15-84.
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Accordingly, an accused infringer could not escape liability by simply
arguing that it did not perform one of several method steps. Further,
the “partial infringement” theory seems to not consider any
relationship with another party that may have performed some steps
367
of the asserted method.
Other foreign theories focus on the actions and roles of the
multiple infringing parties. For example, British law requires a
showing that the infringing acts of more than one party were carried
368
out “pursuant to a common design.”
Further, Japan adheres to an
instrumentalist theory where infringement can be found if the
369
conduct of one actor is used as an instrument by another actor. To
protect innocent actors from liability in Japan, however, a consumer
is not liable for infringement for private use of a claimed method or
370
process.
That is, liability will lie only when the consumer makes
371
commercial use of the method or process.
While the “partial infringement” theory would be inconsistent with
372
U.S. law, specifically the “all elements” rule, the more important
point is that there are flexible options for enforcement of interactive
method patents in at least Europe and Japan. In contrast, U.S.
patentees must attempt to draft claims that meet the “single entity”
373
rule. Alternatively, U.S. patentees must show at trial that one actor
374
induced another actor to infringe the patent.
Consequently,
Europe and Japan may be more favorable venues for claimants
wishing to enforce interactive inventions.
F.

Resistance To Change

One argument that was used in support of the direction or control
test is that it shields innocent actors from the harsh results of strict
375
liability for patent infringement.
Commentators have warned that
367. Id. § 15:14, at 15-84 to -85.
368. See Sabaf SpA v. MFI Furniture Ctrs. Ltd., [2004] UKHL 45, [39] (appeal
taken from Eng.), available at http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKHL/2004/45.pdf.
369. See Electrodeposited Image Case, 1764 HANREI JIHO 112 (Tokyo D. Ct.,
Sept. 20, 2001).
370. Mizutani, supra note 333, at 89–90 (distinguishing between private and
commercial use).
371. Id. at 90.
372. See Larsen, supra note 191, at 60.
373. BMC Res., Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P., 498 F.3d 1373, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2007)
(requiring the infringer to perform all steps), overruled by Akamai II, 692 F.3d 1301
(Fed. Cir. 2012) (en banc) (per curiam).
374. See Akamai II, 692 F.3d at 1319 (agreeing that induced infringement is a
viable alternative to the use of the “single entity” rule).
375. See Lemley, supra note 33, at 262 (concluding that construing patent laws to
permit individual, non-infringing acts of unrelated parties to add up to infringement
renders the law meaningless).
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broader rules for determining joint infringement liability will ensnare
376
This is a reasonable concern as these innocent
innocent actors.
actors are generally customers of an alleged infringing service and
377
typically perform only one step in the allegedly infringed claim.
378
The law could easily exempt innocent actors from liability,
though, innocent actors were rarely involved in the cases that have
been litigated. Instead, the parties involved in the joint infringement
379
are usually sophisticated businesses. Accordingly, a flexible test that
exempts innocent actors from liability, but still prevents
misappropriation of an invention by sophisticated parties, is ideal.
Finally, one argument is that proper claim drafting will alleviate
many of the problems with enforcement that claims requiring the
380
actions of multiple parties create. However, in order to accurately
claim an invention, some claims cannot be written to capture a single
381
Further, technology exists that allows claims properly
infringer.
directed to a single infringer to be performed by more than one
382
party.
Accordingly, while proper claim drafting may address
fundamental mistakes, it is not a blanket solution.
In sum, the law should undertake a more flexible procedure for
determining when a method claim is infringed by separate entities
each performing separate steps of the method claim. Accordingly,
instead of relying on inducement theory or focusing solely on the
nature of the relationship between relevant actors, this article
383
suggests a broader approach detailed below.

376. See id. (stating that joint infringement unreasonably expands liability).
377. See id. at 261 (discussing cases where alleged infringers were customers of the
defendant).
378. See 35 U.S.C. § 287(c)(1) (2006) (exempting medical practitioners and
health care entities from infringement for performance of a medical activity).
379. See, e.g., McKesson Techs. Inc. v. Epic Sys. Corp., 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1281
(Fed. Cir. 2011), rev’d sub nom. Akamai II, 692 F.3d 1301; Akamai I, 629 F.3d 1311,
1314 (Fed. Cir. 2010), rev’d, 692 F.3d 1301; Muniauction, Inc. v. Thomson Corp., 532
F.3d 1318, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2008), overruled by Akamai II, 692 F.3d 1301; BMC Res., Inc.
v. Paymentech, L.P., 498 F.3d 1373, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2007), overruled by Akamai II, 692
F.3d 1301.
380. See Lemley et al., supra note 33, at 272 (proposing that drafting a unitary
claim will avoid the pitfalls of attempting to prove indirect infringement).
381. See Lee, supra note 39, at 349 (“Because most Internet activities involve
connecting a computer to the Internet, it is likely that the inventiveness of Internetrelated patents lies in the combinations of steps and elements, and not in an
individual step or element that is obvious or known.”).
382. See Golden Hour Data Sys., Inc. v. emsCharts, Inc., 614 F.3d 1367, 1369–71
(Fed. Cir. 2010) (describing a patented computer system integrating dispatch clinical
services and billing data into one module).
383. See discussion infra Part III.
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III. PROPOSALS FOR REFORM
A. Overview
The current test for joint infringement relies on an inducement
theory. Further, the proposed tests for joint infringement in Judge
Linn’s dissent focus solely on the nature of the relationship between
384
relevant actors.
This section identifies additional considerations
that should factor into a joint infringement determination. Given
these considerations, this section proposes a test for determining
when a method claim is infringed if separate entities each perform
separate steps of the method claim. The goal of the tests is (1) to
take into account the various ways joint infringement can occur and
(2) to yield fair, consistent, and predictable results upon application.
How the law will apportion liability amongst two or more joint
385
infringers is beyond the scope of this paper.
Incorporating these
tests into a judicial or legislative framework for reform will afford
courts more flexibility in analyzing joint infringement cases. In sum,
a new, more flexible standard for enforcement will encourage
patentees to continue to file applications for innovative interactive
386
method inventions.
There are generally three claim scenarios in which joint
infringement is asserted. In the first scenario, the patentee has
poorly drafted claims directed to more than one entity, much like in
387
BMC.
The second scenario involves “single entity claims” where
the patentee has drafted claims directed to a single infringer, but the
nature of the method allows for the actors to split up performance of
388
the steps and obtain some benefit.
In the third scenario, called
“interactive claims,” the method is interactive in nature, requiring
389
the patentee to include multiple actors in the claim. BMC provided
384. See Golden Hour, 614 F.3d at 1380 (requiring proof of a mastermind’s control
or direction over the entire process in a joint infringement claim); BMC, 498 F.3d at
1380 (finding that courts generally refuse to find liability where one party did not
control or direct each step of the patented process.
385. See Corrected Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note 339, at *15 (“How much each
party is accountable is a matter of apportionment more suitable for damages
calculations rather than liability determination.”).
386. See McKesson Techs. Inc. v. Epic Sys. Corp., 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1281, 1291
(Fed. Cir. 2011) (Newman, J., dissenting) (warning that the court has created a
cynical and expensive delusion to encourage innovators to develop unenforceable
patents for interactive technologies), rev’d en banc, per curiam sub nom. Akamai II, 692
F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
387. See BMC, 498 F.3d at 1375–77 (describing BMC’s infringement claim, which
involved customer use of the patent).
388. See Larsen, supra note 191, at 63 (arguing that this type of claim should have
no less of a right to exclude others).
389. See Corrected Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note 339, at *16 (“If the essence of
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a simple solution for the first scenario: Draft better claims.
However, the Federal Circuit has not distinguished between joint
infringement of claims directed to a single entity and joint
infringement of claims that require the participation of multiple
391
actors. What follows is a flexible proposal for addressing the second
and third scenarios.
B. Single Entity Claims
The following approach applies to a claim in which all the steps of
a method claim are directed to a single infringer or the claim does
not require performance of the steps by multiple parties. These
claims presumably do not have the same drafting problems as the
392
claims in BMC.
Unfortunately, multiple entities may still split up
393
the performance of these steps for their mutual benefit.
Where
insufficient evidence of the nature of the relationship between
relevant actors exists, this approach recommends that the court take
into account evidence of collaboration, concerted action, and the
benefit realized to determine if there should be joint infringement
394
liability. In addition, the approach suggests that factors considered
traditionally at common law, the nature of the activity and intent, also
be taken into account.
The Golden Hour factors
Proper claim drafting cannot solve every problem. This is
especially true where all the steps of a method claim are directed to a
single infringer or do not require performance of the steps by
multiple parties. An example of how this type of claim might be
written is included below:
1.

15. A computerized method of generating a patient encounter
record, comprising the steps of:

the invention is the interaction between users . . . the patentee should not be forced
to draft claims . . . to capture a single user . . . .”).
390. See BMC, 498 F.3d at 1381 (“A patentee can usually structure a claim to
capture infringement by a single party.”).
391. See McKesson, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1283 (combining actions of multiple
parties to perform the steps of a claim, but requiring one party—or single entity—to
exercise control); Akamai I, 629 F.3d 1311, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (holding that the
plaintiff put itself in a position where it would have to attribute actions of third
parties to the defendant, culminating in a single entity claim), rev’d, 692 F.3d 1301.
392. See BMC, 498 F.3d at 1381 (“BMC chose . . . to have four different parties
perform different acts within one claim.”).
393. See Golden Hour Data Sys. v. emsCharts, Inc., 614 F.3d 1367, 1369 (Fed. Cir.
2010) (discussing a comprehensive data system where each component is capable of
being used by different parties).
394. See discussion infra Part III.B.1.
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collecting flight information relating to an emergency transport
crew dispatch;
collecting patient information from a clinical encounter associated
with a patient incident requiring emergency medical care by the
emergency transport crew; and
integrating the patient information with the flight information to
produce an encounter record indicative of the patient’s clinical
395
encounter.

Unfortunately, current technology could allow for two or more
entities to split performance of these steps and still implement a
beneficial and useful process. As of the writing of this paper, if more
than one party performed each of the steps, under the current
inducement standard, the patentee would have to prove that one of
396
the parties induced the other in performance of the method steps.
Absent this showing, two sophisticated parties could split
397
performance of a claimed method for their mutual benefit. Relying
398
on the facts in Golden Hour Data Sys., Inc. v. emsCharts, Inc. the
proposed recommendation attempts to address this scenario in a way
that does not ensnare innocent actors and yet provides a consistent
399
framework for enforcement.
a.

Collaboration or partnership

Where the steps of an asserted method claim are directed to a
single entity or do not require performance of multiple parties and
are performed by more than one party, evidence of a collaboration or
partnership between the parties should weigh in favor of a finding of
joint infringement. The determination of whether a collaboration or
partnership exists should depend on the facts of the case. One
amicus curiae has argued that there must be a legal tie between two
400
parties in order for there to be a finding of joint infringement.
395. U.S. Patent No. 6,117,073, at col. 21 l. 54–col. 22 l.7 (filed Mar. 2, 1998).
396. See discussion supra Part II (discussing the courts’ use of the direction or
control standard).
397. See Golden Hour, 614 F.3d at 1371 (discussing defendants’ collaboration to
combine their systems into one unit).
398. 614 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
399. Softtech (a company that produced computer-aided flight dispatch software)
and emsCharts (a company that provided a web-based patient information and
billing system) formed a partnership enabling their two programs to work together.
Id. at 1371. This collaboration created a unit that resembled Golden Hour’s
comprehensive system. See id. at 1369–70 (describing Golden Hour’s patent).
400. See Amici Curiae Internet Retailers’ Brief in Support of Defendant/CrossAppellant’s En Banc Response Brief at 6, Akamai II, 692 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2012)
(en banc) (per curiam) (Nos. 2009-1372, -1380, -1416, -1417), 2011 WL 3796786, at
*6 (setting forth a test to determine quality of a sufficiently significant legal
relationship as to whether there is a contractual obligation).
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However, requiring a legal relationship leaves open the opportunity
401
Instead, evidence such as joint
for gamesmanship of the system.
sales activities, joint promotional activities, and any other joint activity
with respect to the accused method should weigh in favor of a finding
402
of joint infringement. Joint activity by itself is not enough, however.
The law should also take other considerations such as the action of
the parties into account.
b.

Concerted action

The performance of all the steps of a claimed method by the
concerted action of all of the relevant actors should weigh in favor of
a finding of joint infringement. In Wallace v. Holmes the court held
that two parties jointly infringed a patent by acting in concert with
403
each other.
Further, the court in Heaton-Peninsular Button-Fastener
Co. stated that when patent infringement is brought about by a
“concert of action,” all engaged directly and intentionally are joint
404
infringers. Moreover, the Second Restatement of Torts states that a
party is subject to liability if he “does a tortious act in concert with
405
the other or pursuant to a common design with him.”
The facts in Golden Hour are an example of “concerted action.” At
trial, the jury found that two companies, emsCharts and Softech
enabled their respective programs to work together such that their
combined system, which they sold as a package, met all the
406
limitations of several of the asserted claims.
Similar evidence of
action on behalf of each party to perform claimed steps of a method
would probably rise to the level of “concerted action.” Finally,
whether the parties acted in concert or not, the benefit of their
actions should also be examined.
c.

Benefit

Evidence of either an entity obtaining a commercial (competitive
or financial) benefit should weigh in favor of a finding of joint
401. See Golden Hour Data Sys. v. emsCharts, Inc., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1565,
1568 (E.D. Tex. 2009) (“The agreement defined the relationship as not creating ‘any
agency, partnership, joint venture, or employer/employee relationship.’”), aff’d in
part, vacated in part, 614 F.3d 1367.
402. Amicus Curiae Brief of Biotechnology Industry Organization in Support of
Neither Party, Akamai II, 692 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (en banc) (per curiam)
(Nos. 2009-1372, -1380, -1416, -1417), 2011 WL 3101890, at *27–28.
403. Wallace v. Holmes, 29 F. Cas. 74, 80 (C.C.D. Conn. 1871) (No. 17,100).
404. Heaton-Peninsular Button-Fastener Co. v. Eureka Specialty Co., 77 F. 288,
297 (6th Cir. 1896).
405. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876(a) (1979).
406. Golden Hour, 614 F.3d at 1383 (Newman, J., dissenting).
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infringement. Patent law has created legal doctrines that prevent
407
infringers from stealing the benefit of an invention. Further, courts
have found parties liable for contributory infringement to prevent
408
them from obtaining the benefit of a patent.
In addition,
European law allows patentees to recover under its own “partial
infringement” theory in order to prevent infringers from
409
appropriating the commercial benefit of the invention.
Accordingly, an inquiry into what benefit is obtained by the relevant
actors is supported by both domestic and international law and
policy.
Once again, the facts in Golden Hour illustrate this principle.
Softech and emsCharts both benefited economically and
410
competitively by selling their combined system.
That is, in the
absence of evidence that one party directed or controlled the other,
emsCharts and Softech thwarted the policy of the patent system by
411
misappropriating the benefit of an invention.
2.

Other factors for consideration
In addition to the Golden Hour factors enumerated above, the law
412
should consider at least two other factors. The intent of the parties
could be examined. In addition, the law could analyze the nature of
the alleged infringing activities being performed by each party.
For example, absent a showing of direction or control,
performance of a step like the “initiating step” in McKesson should
413
Such an initiating
weigh against a finding of joint infringement.
step is superfluous and is exactly the type of claim language that the
414
Federal Circuit has said it will not rewrite. Further, the law should
407. See Royal Typewriter Co. v. Remington Rand, Inc., 168 F.2d 691, 692 (2d Cir.
1948) (describing the purpose of the doctrine of equivalents to achieve this result).
408. See Mobil Oil Corp. v. W. R. Grace & Co., 367 F. Supp. 207, 212, 253 (D.
Conn. 1973) (allowing plaintiff’s claim for contributory infringement where the
defendant was able to achieve all benefits of its patent by making each of its
customers its agents in completing the infringing step).
409. See Pagenberg, supra note 362, at 319–21 (discussing the French and German
approaches).
410. Golden Hour, 614 F.3d at 1383 (Newman, J., dissenting).
411. Id. at 1382–83.
412. These factors are not new. They are similar to the factors courts analyzed
before the 1952 Patent Act and district courts took note of after BMC. See discussion
supra Part II.
413. For an example of drafting such an initiating step, see U.S. Patent No.
6,757,898, col. 44 l. 60–col. 45 l. 24 (filed Jan. 18, 2000) (describing the step of
“initiating a communication by one of the plurality of users to the provider for
information, wherein the provider has established a preexisting medical record for
each user”).
414. The Federal Circuit has stated:
The steps of the claim might have featured references to a single party’s
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discourage similar claim language that is indicative of non415
That is, performance of a
commercial consumer participation.
claimed step that is for that party’s own private benefit or use should
416
also weigh against a finding of joint infringement.
In contrast, a commercial step similar to the “tagging step” in
417
Akamai I would weigh in favor of a finding of joint infringement.
The “tagging step” is analogous to the act of the customer who
418
supplied the chimney in Wallace to complete the lamp. That is, this
step is of the character that it simply must be performed for any
beneficial use of the method to be realized and could be performed
by any party.
Further, similar to early contributory infringement cases, the law
419
should also consider the intent of the parties.
Liability for direct
420
Accordingly,
infringement does not require a showing of intent.
this proposal does not suggest that intent (knowledge or willful
421
blindness) be required.
Instead, this recommendation suggests
only that evidence of intent by one or more parties weigh in favor of a
finding of joint infringement.

supplying or receiving each element of the claimed process. However, BMC
chose instead to have four different parties perform different acts within one
claim. BMC correctly notes the difficulty of proving infringement of this
claim format. Nonetheless, this court will not unilaterally restructure the
claim or the standards for joint infringement to remedy these ill-conceived
claims.
BMC Res., Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P., 498 F.3d 1373, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2007), overruled by
Akamai II, 692 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (en banc) (per curiam).
415. See Harold C. Wegner, E-Business Patent Infringement: Quest for a Direct
Infringement Claim Model 13–15 (Nov. 21, 2001) (unpublished manuscript),
available at http://www.softic.or.jp/symposium/open_materials/10th/en/wegneren.pdf (tracing the joint infringement theory in Supreme Court and appellate case
law).
416. Mizutani, supra note 333, at 89–90 (distinguishing the implications of
consumers using patented technology for private or commercial benefits).
417. See U.S. Patent No. 6,108,703, col. 6 l. 41–46 (filed May 19, 1999) (outlining a
similar commercial step); see also Akamai I, 629 F.3d 1311, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2011)
(describing the customer’s use of the “tagging” feature), rev’d, 692 F.3d 1301.
418. Wallace v. Holmes, 29 F. Cas. 74, 79 (C.C.D. Conn. 1871) (No. 17,100).
419. See Henry v. A.B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1, 48–49 (1912) (considering the intent
and purpose of the defendant when determining whether infringement occurred),
overruled by Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502
(1917).
420. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2006) (lacking intent in the statutory language dictating
that “whoever without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented
invention, within the United States or imports into the United States any patented
invention during the term of the patent therefor, infringes the patent”).
421. See Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. 2060, 2066 (2011)
(discussing earlier cases requiring an intention to bring about a patent’s specific
use). Not requiring intent distinguishes the proposed test from § 271(b) and (c),
which require inducement or knowing respectively.
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3.

Summary
In sum, the above approach applies only to claims where all the
steps of a method claim are directed to a single infringer or do not
require performance of the steps by multiple parties. These claims
presumably do not have the same drafting problems as the claims in
422
BMC.
Unfortunately, advances in technology may nevertheless
423
allow multiple entities to split up the claimed method steps. Where
no evidence of direction or control, agency or a contractual
obligation is present, this approach recommends that the court take
into account and weigh the factors outlined above to determine if
there should be joint infringement liability.
C. “Interactive Claims”
Despite the Federal Circuit’s warning concerning claim drafting,
patentees have the option to draft method claims that require the
424
actions of more than one actor.
There may be many reasons
patentees draft claims this way; for example, interactive claim
language may be the best way to capture the interactive nature of the
425
invention.
For the purpose of this discussion, these claims will be
referred to as “interactive claims.” In either case, the inducementonly rule and the direction or control test place a patentee seeking to
426
enforce interactive claims at a severe disadvantage. As one amicus
curiae explained, if the invention is interactive in nature, the
patentee should not be forced to draft claims directed to single
427
infringers so that those claims can then be enforced.
The proposed approach undertakes a two-step procedure in order
to determine joint infringement liability. First, it suggests that the
428
patentee provide a rationale for an asserted claim’s interactivity.

422. See BMC Res., Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P., 498 F.3d 1373, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2007)
(noting that BMC could have drafted its claim to focus on one entity instead of
having four parties perform different acts within one claim in order to avoid
infringement), overruled by Akamai II, 692 F.3d 1301.
423. See Golden Hour Data Sys., Inc. v. emsCharts, Inc., 614 F.3d 1367, 1380 (Fed.
Cir. 2010) (involving combined actions of the patent by multiple parties).
424. See BMC, 498 F.3d at 1381 (highlighting that BMC chose to structure their
claim to require four different actors).
425. See Corrected Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note 339, at *16.
426. See Muniauction, Inc. v. Thomson Corp., 532 F.3d 1318, 1330 (Fed. Cir.
2008) (finding no liability for direct infringement and no legal theory to support
joint infringement where no evidence of direction or control was presented),
overruled by Akamai II, 692 F.3d 1301; BMC, 498 F.3d at 1381–82 (stressing the
importance of the direction or control test in determining whether infringement has
occurred).
427. Corrected Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note 339, at *16.
428. See discussion infra Part III.C.1.
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Second, the proposed standard suggests that the court apply a test for
429
joint infringement based on the result of the interactivity inquiry.
Accordingly, the proposed standard does not force a patentee to
draft claims directed to a single infringer by providing a flexible
alternative to the newly minted inducement-only test.
1.

Nexus between interactivity and patentability
The proposed standard borrows loosely from the general
framework set forth in Warner-Jenkins Co. v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co.
In Warner-Jenkins, the Supreme Court articulated the standard for the
430
doctrine of equivalents. Similar to the joint infringement doctrine,
one of the major concerns of the court in Warner-Jenkins was giving
proper deference to the role of claim drafting in providing public
431
notice and defining the invention. Accordingly, the proposed test
is narrowly defined to avoid conflict with the public-notice function
432
of the statutory claiming requirement.
The proposed test recommends that the law inquire as to whether
there is a nexus between the “interactivity” of a method claim (that
is, the reason why the claims require more than one actor) and the
433
patentability of the claim.
Evidence that a proposed claim’s
interactivity was a factor in its allowance may indicate that the USPTO
granted the patentee a limited monopoly because the claim’s
“interactivity” was at least part of what made the claim novel and
434
nonobvious. Imposing a rigid standard for enforcement such as the
inducement-only direction or control test on these types of
interactive claims would severely frustrate the patentee’s ability to
435
enforce that monopoly.
If a nexus exists, then under this

429. See discussion infra Part III.C.2.
430. Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 33 (1997)
(stating that the introduction of a new element does not preclude infringement by
equivalents of that element).
431. Id. (“Mindful that claims do indeed serve both a definitional and a notice
function, we think the better rule is to place the burden on the patent holder to
establish the reason for an amendment required during patent prosecution.”).
432. Id. at 29 (quoting Judge Nies, stating that “[a] distinction can be drawn . . .
between substitution of an equivalent for a component in an invention and enlarging
the metes and bounds of the invention beyond what is claimed” (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
433. See supra note 339 and accompanying text.
434. See 35 U.S.C. § 103(c) (2006) (setting forth the conditions for patentability).
435. See Muniauction, Inc. v. Thomson Corp., 532 F.3d 1318, 1329–30 (Fed. Cir.
2008), overruled by Akamai II, 692 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (en banc) (per curiam);
BMC Res., Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P., 498 F.3d 1373, 1381–82 (Fed. Cir. 2007),
overruled by Akamai II, 692 F.3d 1301. Further, it is foreseeable that a test for
infringement that focuses on the type of relationship between the parties could cause
a patentee to spend a great deal of time attempting to broadly claim the relationship
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recommendation, the inducement-only test would not be the
determinative inquiry in establishing whether the claim is jointly
infringed. Instead, this proposal suggests that if there is a nexus
between the interactivity of the claim and its patentability, the law
should weigh the factors outlined in Part III.B. to determine joint
436
infringement liability.
Alternatively, the lack of a nexus between the interactivity of a
claim and its patentability may suggest that interactivity is secondary
to other limitations in the claim or that the claim could have been
437
written so that it was directed to a single infringer.
If there is no
nexus between the interactivity of a claim and its patentability, then
the law should focus on the nature of the relationship between the
438
relevant actors in determining whether a claim was infringed. That
is, such claims would be analyzed to determine whether one party
439
had direction or control over another. Thus, by inquiring into the
significance of the presence of multiple actors in a claim, the
proposed recommendation balances the challenge of describing new
inventions in words with the role of claim drafting in providing
440
public notice and clearly defining the invention.
2.

Proof of a nexus
This section briefly describes how an inquiry into whether there is a
nexus between the “interactivity” of a method claim and the
patentability of the claim may work in practice. In order to make the
evidentiary showing of a nexus, a patentee would primarily rely on
441
intrinsic evidence. The law would set forth what a “nexus” means
in this context. For example, it could mean that the claimed
interactivity is “the reason for,” “reasonably related to,” or
442
“substantially related to” the patentability of the claim.
In
between different parties in the claim instead of focusing on the technical innovation
of the invention.
436. See discussion supra Part III.B (explaining that several factors, including
collaboration, concerted action, the benefit obtained, the nature of the activity being
performed, and intent, should be considered in a joint infringement determination).
437. See BMC, 498 F.3d at 1381; Lemley et al., supra note 33, at 256.
438. See Muniauction, 532 F.3d at 1327; BMC, 498 F.3d at 1381–82.
439. See BMC, 498 F.3d 1373 at 1381–82.
440. Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 33 (1997)
(declaring that it is the burden of the patent holder to establish the reason for
amending a claim during patent prosecution, and then the court would decide
whether that reason was sufficient).
441. Accordingly, statements made in the specification and prosecution history
would be instrumental in determining whether the interactivity of the claim was
related to patentability of the claims.
442. See Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 33 (requiring courts to determine on a caseby-case basis whether a claim amendment was substantially related to patentability).
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implementation, a broad approach would take into account
statements in the specification, the preamble, and the prosecution
history. A more narrow approach would focus specifically on why the
claim was allowed, relying primarily on the prosecution history.
Further, to prevent future patentees from gaming the system by
simply adding new elements distinguishable enough to avoid
infringement under the current law, an ideal standard would
emphasize the prosecution history and the examiner’s reasons for
allowance. To prevent further complexity, it might also be necessary
to restrict the term “patentability” to novel and obviousness
443
concerns.
This recommendation accomplishes two things. First, it provides a
lower hurdle of enforcement for truly innovative interactive method
444
claims.
Second, it protects innocent actors from being subject to
445
Critics
liability for infringement based on poorly drafted claims.
may argue that this would lead to inconsistent results. However,
while the outcome of some cases may change, a preliminary analysis
of the main joint infringement cases heard by the Federal Circuit
indicates that many of its decisions finding no joint infringement
would be upheld under the proposed recommendation.
For example, under the proposed interactivity test outlined above,
the interactive claims asserted in BMC, Muniauction, and McKesson
would all still be subject to the direction or control test instead of the
more flexible test articulated in Part III.B. The claims at issue in
these cases would be subject to the direction or control test because
there is little evidence of a nexus between the interactivity of the
claims and their patentability.
In U.S. Patent No. 5,715,298 (asserted in BMC), for example, the
examiner allowed the application because the prior art did not
446
suggest using a telephone in carrying out the claimed method.
That is, there is no indication that the claimed involvement of various
447
actors was novel or nonobvious.
Similarly, in Muniauction, the
asserted claims included steps performed by the bidder and the

443. For example, the proposed “patentability” determination would ignore
considerations arising under §§ 101 and 112.
444. Interactive claims with a nexus between interactivity and patentability would
be subject to the tests outlined in Part III.B and would not be subject to the direction
or control test.
445. Claims that lacked a nexus between interactivity and patentability would be
subject to the rigid direction or control test.
446. See Notice of Allowability, App. No. 08/787981, at 3–4 (Sept. 2, 1997)
(specifying that a web browser was a component excluded from the claim).
447. Id.
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448

auction service provider. During prosecution, the patentee argued
that their claims were patentable over the prior art primarily because
449
450
The Examiner agreed.
they required the use of a web browser.
Once again, no indication is present that the claimed participation of
the bidder and service provider is related to patentability of the
451
asserted claims.
Finally, in McKesson one of the asserted claims
452
required the actions of both a patient and a healthcare provider.
However, the claim was allowed because the prior art failed to
disclose the limitation automatically generating a patient page/area
453
within the provider’s website.
That is, there is no indication that
the claimed participation of the patient and healthcare provider are
454
Accordingly, while
related to patentability of the asserted claims.
the proposed recommendation is more flexible, as seen in the
examples above, it is also narrowly tailored so that it would not result
in an upheaval of the status quo.
D. Advantages of the Proposed Approach
The proposed recommendation accomplishes two objectives. First,
it permits patentees of claims directed to a single infringer the
455
opportunity to enforce those claims against opportunistic parties.
Second, it gives patentees of truly innovative interactive patents the
456
ability to enforce their patents.
Under both parts of the proposal, the goal is to craft standards that
are fair and rooted in the law. For example, under certain
conditions, the proposed approach recommends that a court
evaluate and weigh certain factors to determine joint infringement
457
liability. Some of these factors find their origin in the common law
concerning contributory infringement codified by the Patent Act of
458
1952. In addition, the factors allow a court to prevent an innocent
459
Similarly,
actor from being subject to joint infringement liability.
448. See U.S. Patent No. 6,161,099, col. 12 l. 64–col. 20 l. 11 (filed May 29, 1998).
449. Notice of Allowability, App. No. 09/087,574, at 4 (Aug. 24, 2000).
450. Id.
451. Id. at 3–4.
452. See U.S. Patent No. 6,757,898, col. 44 l. 60–col. 45 l. 24 (filed Jan. 18, 2000).
453. See McKesson’s Opening Claim Construction Brief at 14, McKesson Info.
Solutions LLC v. Epic Sys. Corp., 495 F. Supp. 2d 1329 (N.D. Ga. 2007) (No. 1:06-CV2965 JTC), 2007 WL 5283762.
454. Id.
455. See discussion supra Part III.B.
456. See discussion supra Part III.C.
457. See discussion supra Part III.B.
458. See discussion supra Part III.B.2.
459. See discussion supra Part III.B.2; see also Wegner, supra note 415, at 10–13
(describing joint infringement theory).
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the proposal prevents an online service provider from being exposed
to patent infringement liability by simply providing a service to its
460
customers.
The proposed recommendations do not attempt to resolve the
issues concerning the single entity doctrine. Instead, they provide a
flexible alternative. One amicus brief, arguing in favor of the single
entity rule, asserted that if a person does not perform each step of a
claimed method, then that person does not appropriate the full
461
economic value of the claimed invention.
However, in Akamai II,
the Federal Circuit opined that an inducer has the same impact on
the patentee whether he induces one party or multiple parties to
462
infringe. Under this “same impact” rationale, one could argue that
multiple parties, whose combined actions infringe a patent,
knowingly or unknowingly, also have the same impact on the
patentee. Accordingly, the proposal set forth in this article suggests
that specific factors concerning the alleged infringing parties must be
weighed including evidence of either party obtaining a commercial
463
(competitive or financial) benefit.
Finally, the proposed recommendation would not encourage or
464
benefit poorly drafted claims.
Claims of the type that the courts
have typically considered poorly drafted would not be subject to a
standard less rigid than direction or control unless there was
evidence of a nexus between the interactivity of the claim and its
465
patentability. In fact, the proposed standard may result in a more
robust specification and more directed arguments during
466
prosecution.
Further, the nexus requirement prevents this
approach from broad application, which would defeat the
467
definitional and public notice functions of claim drafting.

460. Brief of Amicus Curiae New York Intellectual Property Law Association in
Support of Defendant-Cross Appellant on Rehearing En Banc at 5–6, Akamai II, 692
F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (en banc) (per curiam) (Nos. 2009-1372, -1380, -1417),
2011 WL 3796788 (asserting that customers visiting a website should not expose an
online retailer to patent infringement).
461. Id. at 4 (“[A] person who does not practice every step of a method claim does
not appropriate the full economic value of the claimed invention . . . .”).
462. See Akamai II, 692 F.3d at 1308.
463. See supra Part III.B.1.
464. See supra Part III.C.
465. See supra Part III.C.1.
466. See supra Part III.C.2.
467. Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 29 (1997)
(discussing the scope of the doctrine of equivalents and stating “[t]here can be no
denying that the doctrine of equivalents, when applied broadly, conflicts with the
definitional and public-notice functions of the statutory claiming requirement”).
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In sum, the proposed approach recognizes that the issue of joint
infringement can arise in different ways depending upon the asserted
claim. Accordingly, the proposed approach suggests that the law
should address these fact patterns in a more elegant way. As a result,
the proposal grants patentees a better opportunity to enforce their
claims while protecting innocent actors from liability.
CONCLUSION
The Federal Circuit’s new joint infringement test focuses solely on
whether an accused infringer induced a third party to perform some
468
or all of the steps of a claimed method.
Focusing on the
inducement inquiry ignores other practical factors that should be
469
considered in determining liability for joint infringement. Further,
absent evidence of inducement, the Federal Circuit’s joint
470
infringement test does nothing to close the judicial loophole.
Accordingly, the law should undertake a more flexible procedure for
determining joint infringement liability.
The proposed approach suggests that the law impose a two-part test
for determining if a method claim is infringed when separate entities
471
each perform separate steps of a method claim.
The first part of
the test applies to (1) claims directed to a single entity or (2) claims
472
that do not require participation of multiple entities.
For these
claims, in addition to the relationship between relevant actors, the
law should consider and weigh several factors such as concerted
action, commercial benefit, intent, and the nature of the activity
473
performed. The test’s second part applies to claims that specifically
474
require participation of multiple entities. Here, the law should only
468. See Akamai II, 692 F.3d 1301, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (en banc) (per curiam)
(explaining that Limelight would be liable for inducement if “(1) Limelight knew of
Akamai’s patent, (2) it performed all but one of the steps of the method claim, (3) it
induced [its customers] to perform the final step . . . and (4) the [customers] in fact
performed that final step”).
469. See Golden Hour Data Sys., Inc. v. emsCharts, Inc., 614 F.3d 1367, 1382 (Fed.
Cir. 2010) (Newton, J., dissenting) (suggesting the matter should be stayed until
conflicting precedent regarding the factors considered is resolved); ThomsonHouston Elec. Co. v. Ohio Brass Co., 80 F. 712, 723 (6th Cir. 1897) (reviewing intent
of the alleged infringer); Wallace v. Holmes, 29 F. Cas. 74, 80 (C.C.D. Conn. 1871)
(No. 17,100) (examining the useless nature of the components of the patents alone
and the inference that the components would be used together).
470. BMC Res., Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P., 498 F.3d 1373, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2008),
overruled by Akamai II, 692 F.3d 1301.
471. See supra Part III.
472. See supra Part III.B.
473. See Golden Hour, 614 F.3d at 1382 (Newton, J., dissenting); Thomson-Houston,
80 F. at 723; Wallace, 29 F. Cas. at 80.
474. See supra Part III.C.
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consider the factors listed above if there is a nexus between the
475
If no nexus exists,
interactivity of the claim and patentability.
liability should be determined by ascertaining whether there was
inducement or considering the nature of the relationship between
476
relevant actors.
The approach outlined above (1) prevents misappropriation of
new Information Age technology, (2) promotes the public notice
function served by well-crafted claims, and (3) shields innocent actors
from strict liability. Moreover, by providing more flexibility for
enforcement of interactive methods, the proposed approach
encourages innovation and advances the constitutional policies
underlying the Patent Act.

475. See discussion supra Part III.B.
476. See, e.g., Akamai II, 692 F.3d 1301, 1317–18 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (en banc) (per
curiam); Muniauction, Inc. v. Thomson Corp., 532 F.3d 1318, 1329–30 (Fed. Cir.
2008), overruled by Akamai II, 692 F.3d 1301; BMC Res., Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P., 498
F.3d 1373, 1381–82 (Fed. Cir. 2007), overruled by Akamai II, 692 F.3d 1301.

